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PREFACE 
Power in international relations can be defined in several different ways. Power can be 
understood as a goal of states or leaders involving a measure of influence or control over 
outcomes, events, actors and issues; achieving victory in conflict and the attainment of security; 
control over resources and capabilities; or status, which some states or actors possess and other 
do not. Modern discourse in international relations generally speaks in terms of state power, 
indicating both economic and military power. The capabilities to handle those above functions 
are different from state to state and can be measured in different ways as well as with respect to 
different dimensions, among which “hard” and “soft” power can be taken into consideration. In 
the policy-making process of any states, hard power and soft power strategies are rarely 
separated but they are, in fact, closely related. The relationship between hard power and soft 
power has become an increasingly popular topic both inside and outside the USA in considering 
how to strengthen its status in the world arena, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. American 
politicians, businessmen and scholars have constantly stressed the need and the opportunities of 
using soft power instead of hard power to manage the USA’s international relations, especially in 
this important region.  
The policy of the U.S. government towards this region is reflected through its strategic rebalance 
towards the Asia-Pacific region, which was announced by the Obama Administration in 2010. 
Since it came into being, this strategy has been described by several names including “return”, 
“pivot” or “rebalancing to Asia”. Although the strategy may be referred to by different names, it 
aims at describing the new prioritization in the foreign and national security policy of the United 
States. In order to examine the importance of both “hard” and “soft” power in international 
relations, American soft power and the implementation of its soft power in the “rebalancing” 
strategy, four research questions come to mind. They are: 
1. What are the definitions soft power and hard power in international relations? 
2. How does the US make use of both hard and soft power in building its capabilities and 
position in the region of Asia-Pacific? 
3. What are the US’s intentions in its announced shift in focus to the Asia-Pacific region? 
4. What are the regional responses to the US’ policy including by Vietnam? 
5. What ensures the future success of the rebalance in the region? 
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Due to the US’s growing emphasis on the use of soft power, the research will focus specifically 
on two questions; what are the soft power strategies of the US in this region; and what are 
Vietnam’s attitudes towards these strategies. 
If one can distinguish soft power elements in this policy shift, it is still important to consider the 
role of hard power elements and what larger regional role the US will play if its policy shift is 
successful. The focus of the research is on US actions and will exclude the effects of the policy 
on domestic policies in the Asia-Pacific, with the exception of briefly summarizing the changing 
stance of regional countries, thereby, showing the effects of American soft power on the region 
and on the US itself. 
Before examining the research questions, a theoretical framework will be provided in the first 
section of this paper discussing the content of hard power and soft power as described by several 
political analysts and theorists. This aims at giving an idea of the numerous definitions attached 
to hard and soft power as well as to lay out the analytical tools for the third section in which the 
“pivot” in the US’s Asia-Pacific policy will be examined. In the next section, regional attitudes 
towards the US’ “rebalancing” strategy, especially Vietnam’s, will be surveyed. The thesis will 
conclude with a discussion on whether these strategies are in line with the US’s use of soft power 
with their  policies in other parts of the world and why the use of soft power, which can help to 
ensure the successes of this policy direction, does not yet seem to have received adequate 
attention. 
The significance of the study will be to enhance understanding of the role of hard and soft power 
in building the US’s status in the world arena, especially in realizing its “return to Asia” strategy. 
Moreover, this study may interest those whose work is closely related to the US and its policies, 
especially in the Asia-Pacific region, enabling them to have more understanding, which they can 
use to initiate appropriate strategies in their work.  
It is obvious from the broad audiences above that a census is not feasible for this study. 
Accordingly, the research approach includes informal interviews in which a sample from the 
target population of interested parties is used for the study. In total, a sample of 20 was selected. 
First, the target population was divided into political leadership, governmental officials and other 
relevant peoples in the Asia-Pacific region. Then they were grouped into those who are 
3 
 
experienced, non-experienced and little experienced in working with the US. This ensured a fair 
representation of each group since their understanding and experiences are significantly 
different. The focus of the study is on personal attitudes and perceptions and the importance of 
primary data cannot be over-emphasized. Before the collection of actual data, the researcher sent 
introductory letters from the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations to the sampled offices 
and institutions. The initial visit to the selected offices and institutions was therefore to introduce 
the researcher, obtain familiarity with those offices and institutions as well as seek their consent 
for the study. The researcher collected data by administering a questionnaire. The questionnaire 
used open questions, consisting of five questions seeking to answer research questions related to 
soft power and the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The results of the study should provide 
interested parties with a panorama of the US’s “return to Asia” strategy, its contributions to 
development in relations between the US and the region’s countries and Vietnam’s responses to 
it with specific respect to its soft power elements. In particular, the insights yielded by the study 
into the role of soft power should tell much about the likely success of this policy and its 
implications for those in the region who interact with the US.  
Although this research was carefully prepared, it still has some limitations. First, the research 
was conducted in such a short time that it was not possible for the researcher to read all the 
materials related to the topic. Therefore, the thesis cannot reflect all aspects of the issue. Second, 
the population of the sample population was small, only 20. In addition, since the researcher 
conducted the interviews herself, it is unavoidable that a certain degree of subjectivity can be 
found in this study.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
I. SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
1. What is soft power? 
Power is a core concept in both comparative politics and international relations. In reality, “a 
state must have certain capabilities to perform certain essential functions. It must have the 
capacity to maintain macroeconomic stability and ensure economic growth; to make long-term 
promises credible, and implement and enforce policies over time; and to ensure that policies are 
not captured by special interests”.1  Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman have drawn up a 
particularly helpful list of state capabilities. They identify ten such capabilities: 
“1. To set and maintain priorities among the many conflicting demands made upon them so that 
they are not overwhelmed and bankrupted; 
 2. To target resources where they are most effective; 
 3. To innovate when old policies have failed; 
 4. To coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent whole; 
 5. To be able to impose losses on powerful groups; 
 6. To represent diffuse, unorganized interests in addition to concentrated, well-organized ones; 
 7. To ensure effective implementation of government policies once they have been decided 
upon; 
 8. To ensure policy stability so that policies have time to work; 
 9. To make and maintain international commitments in the realms of trade and national defense 
to ensure their long-term well-being; 
 10. To manage political cleavages to ensure that the society does not degenerate into civil war.”2 
 
Beside the ten capabilities mentioned above, state capabilities may also include the ability to 
ensure that policies would be adaptable to changed requirements in certain circumstances. 
Moreover, there is also the need “to ensure coherence across policy domains so that new policies 
                                                             
1 “The Politics of Policies”, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America 2006 Report, David Rockefeller Center 
for Latin America Studies, Harvard University, Chapter 6, p.132. 
2 R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, editors, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United 
States and Abroad, The Booking Institution, 1993, p.6. 
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fit well with existing ones, and to ensure effective policy coordination among different actors 
operating in the same policy domain”.3 The capabilities to handle those above functions are 
different from state to state and can be measured in different ways as well as with respect to 
different dimensions.  
In political theory, power has been defined in several different ways. Power can be understood 
as: a goal of states or leaders involving a measure of influence or control over outcomes, events, 
actors and issues; achieving victory in conflict and the attainment of security; control over 
resources and capabilities; or status, which some states or actors possess and other do not. 
According to Robert A. Dahl, “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do”, which could be understood that power is the ability 
of one actor to influence actions, to cause effects on the outcomes he wants, or to change the 
behaviors of the others to make this happen.4  Modern discourse in international relations 
generally speaks in terms of state power, ranging from such elements as territory, population and 
natural resources to economic strength, military power and political stability.5In international 
relations theory, power is simply defined as the possession of capabilities or resources that can 
influence outcomes. It can be interpreted that a country may be considered powerful only when it 
has a large population, territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military force 
and social stability.6 Power is viewed and defined in different ways in the eyes of realists and 
constructivists. Realists normally see international relations largely as a realm of power and 
interest. They assume that the real issues of international politics can be understood by the 
rational analysis of competing interests defined in terms of power.7 They seem to stress the 
importance of the state’s ability to influence others by means of tangible and coercive sources of 
power, or “threat’ and “force”, or hard power in other words. Furthermore, they focus on how the 
distribution of material power, such as military force and economic capabilities as well, defines 
                                                             
3 The Politics of Policies, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America 2006 Report, David Rockefeller Center 
for Latin America Studies, Havard University, Chapter 6, Box 6.1, State Capabilities. 
4 Robert A. Dahl., “The Concept of Power”- Behavioral Science, 2:3,July, 1957, p.201 
5 Nye, Joseph S. Jr. 2002. The American Paradox of Power: Why The World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone. 
Oxford University Press, Inc., p.4 
6 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004 
7 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000 (quoted from Smith, 1986, 
pp.219-221) 
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balances of power between states and explains the behaviors of states.8 This way of 
understanding makes power become concrete, measurable and predictable. However, states 
which solely use hard power do not always get the outcomes they want.  
On the other hand, in the view of social constructivism, human awareness and its place in world 
affairs is much more significant. It is argued that the most important aspect of international 
relations is social, not material. “The international system is not something “out there” like the 
solar system. It does not exist on its own. It exists only as an inter-subjective awareness among 
people; in that sense, the system is constituted by ideas, not by material forces.” 9 In the light of 
constructivism, in 1990, Joseph S. Nye Jr. initially coined the concept of “soft power” which 
comes from intangible sources such as culture, basic principles, values and public diplomacy.10 
Hard power and soft power are distinguished from each other by the nature of the behavior and 
in the tangibility of the resources. Nye saw hard power as command power which “rests on 
coercion or inducement”, while he thinks of soft power as co-optive power which rests on the 
attractiveness of one’s culture and values or “the ability to manipulate the agenda of political 
choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be 
too unrealistic”.11 
Traditionally, state power used to be measured by military and economic power, or hard power, 
implying that the only way to define a great power is to test its strength for war. However, in the 
21st century, the influence of the information revolution and globalization has dramatically 
changed the nature of power in world politics, especially in terms of its sources and distribution 
on different issues. It cannot be denied that, due to globalization, dramatic science and 
technology revolutions, the foundation of power in the contemporary age no longer seems to 
stress military force and conquest. There are several reasons for this phenomenon, among which 
the information technology revolution, nationalism, social changes inside great powers and 
economic objectives have been the most important. Firstly, the information technology 
revolution has helped to create modern, high-technological and precision weapons, which lead 
many countries to become military superpowers. Secondly, the rise of nationalism makes it more 
                                                             
8 Jackson, Robert and Sorensen, Georg, Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches, 3rd 
edition, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.162 
9 Ibid. p.209 
10 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, 1990 
11 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p.7 
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and more difficult for any great powers to rule over emerging populations. For example, the 
failure of the Cold War superpowers in the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars made them discover 
that this kind of intervention is very costly. Third is the social changes inside great powers. Since 
governments now tend to pay more attention to welfare rather than glory, they reduce their 
concentration on military force. The application of military power is only considered when their 
survival is endangered. In the worst case when military conflicts cannot be prevented, it is 
necessary to gain and ensure international support for this use of force. In the contemporary 
world, countries are divided into four categories: poor, weak pre-industrial, modernizing 
industrial states and post-industrial societies. It appears that the use of force tends to be more 
popular in the first type of country, “still accepted in the second, but less tolerated in the third”12, 
and even less so in the fourth. Robert Cooper, a British diplomat, has stated that “a large number 
of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer”, which means that war remains 
possible but it tends to be less acceptable now than it used to be a century or even half a century 
ago.13 The last reason, which may explain the limitation in the use of military force relates to 
economic realities. Whenever a state starts thinking about carrying out any kinds of military 
interventions, economic objectives of states have to be taken into consideration. Thomas 
Friedman has stated that countries are disciplined by an “electronic herd” of investors who 
control their access to capital in a globalised economy.14 Consequently, it is rather difficult to 
imagine in the present world arena a scenario in which a country would use military force to 
colonize others.  
It is not difficult to see that there is also a reason to believe that the deployment of soft power can 
be equally or even more effective than hard power in achieving state objectives in today’s 
globalized world. The chief executive of IBM has stated that “command-and-control approaches 
simply do not work anymore”, which means that the use of “threat” or force may not be as useful 
as it used to be. Moreover, today’s generations tend to respond better to instructors who play “a 
more counseling type role”.15 According to Nye, soft power is “the second face of power” or it is 
                                                             
12 Nye, Joseph S. Jr., The American Paradox of Power: Hard and Soft Power in a Global Information Age, Oxford 
University Press, Inc., 2002,  p.3 
13 Robert Cooper, The Post Modern State and The World Order, London: Demos/ The Foreign Policy Centre, 2000, 
p. 22. 
14 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and The Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, New York: Basic Books, 1989.  
15 Undersecretary of Defense Davis Chu, and Lt.Col. Mike Jones, head of Army National Guard recruiting quoted in 
Associated Press, Pentagon Softens Instructors’ Role, Washington Times, October 11, 2006, p.4  
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the indirect way to get what you want and it rests on the ability to shape the preferences of 
others. At the personal level, soft power could be understood as the power of attraction and 
seduction. In each world and each field, soft power is expressed and interpreted differently. In 
the business world, soft power is expressed through two levels of leadership and business 
activities. Regarding leadership, soft power means attracting others to do what you want  by 
leading by example and competence rather than issuing commands and orders. Regarding 
business activities, soft power is represented by the capability to get others to buy in to your 
values and to manage business networks depending on “talent and trust”.16 The fact is that a 
business leader cannot run a large multinational company only by commands or threat alone.  
In international relations, a country possesses soft power if it has the ability to make others 
admire its values, emulate its examples, aspire to its level of prosperity and want to follow it. 
Soft power relies on both inducement and attraction or intangible assets including attractive 
personality, culture, political values and institutions as well as policies. Some people may argue 
that soft power is merely influence but if they mean that, soft and hard power is quite similar. 
Apart from influence, soft power is also the ability to attract rather than persuasion or the ability 
to move people by arguments. Therefore, Nye also called soft power “attractive power”. In 
international politics, soft power rests on the values expressed in the culture of an organizations 
or a country, in its internal practices and policies as well as in the way the relations between 
them and others are handled.17 Many political leaders including US Presidents Franklin 
Roosevelt and John Kennedy realized that the ability to attract others and move their opinions 
was an important element of power. Meanwhile, they understood the importance of soft power at 
a very early stage. There is a truth that a country suffering from economic and military decline 
loses some of its abilities to shape the international agenda which relate to hard power resources, 
and also some of its attractiveness as well. However, this does not mean that country’s soft 
power depends on hard power.  For instance, the Soviet Union once had a good deal of soft 
power but it lost much of it after the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet 
Union’s soft power declined even as its hard economic and military resources continued to grow.   
                                                             
16 Philip Evans and Bob Wolf, Collaboration Rules, Harvard Business Review, July-August 2005, p.102 
17 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004 
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In the contemporary international arena, there exists a number of transnational issues like 
terrorism, international crimes, climate change, global warming as well as the spread of 
infectious diseases. Consequently, power is chaotically distributed and organized among state 
and non-state actors, some of which also include economic assistance and peacekeeping 
responsibilities in their national interests to make up their soft power. Michael Ignatieff describes 
the position of Canada from a similar point of view: “Influence derives from three assets: moral 
authority as a good citizen which we have got some of, military capability which we have got a 
less of, and international assistance capability.”18  
2.  Resources of soft power 
The soft power of a country can derive from many sources among which its culture, political 
values and foreign policies prove to be the most important. First of all, culture can be defined as 
a set of values and practices that create meaning for a society or as a set of values and policies to 
promote values and interest that others share. It includes everything from language, religion, 
cuisine, social habits, music, arts, etc. However, whether soft power can be effectively created 
from popular culture or not depends on the context in which it is applied. Nye argued that when 
the culture of a country has universal values and its policies help to promote values and interests 
that others share, that country would increase the possibility to achieve its desired outcomes. It 
seems that the best way to transmit culture is through personal contacts, visits or exchanges. For 
example, nowadays, there are more than half a million foreign students who study every year in 
American universities and colleges including over 16,000 Vietnamese students. The American 
values, ideas and styles influence them so deeply that when they return to their home countries, 
they try to do things as Americans do. Similarly, the Asian entrepreneurs who return home after 
starting a successful business in Silicon Valley have the tendency to reach elites with power. 
Another example can be seen in China, where many leaders have a child studying in the States. 
There is no doubt that they would to some extent imitate or follow the view of the country where 
they are educated when coming back to China after graduating. Apart from culture, a 
government’s domestic and foreign policies are a potential source of soft power. The longevity 
of the policies’ effects depend mostly on the context in which they are applied. It appears that 
                                                             
18 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Canada in the Age of Terror—Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth’, Policy Options 
(February 2003) pp. 16, 17, quoted in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2004) p. 10. 
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foreign policies have stronger effects on social power than domestic ones. Nevertheless, 
government policies are like a two-bladed knife since they can both reinforce or waste soft 
power. Government policies based only on a narrow approach to national interests could 
certainly undermine soft power. After the Iraq War in 2003, there was a decline in the 
attractiveness of the U.S’s soft power. Those people who felt less attracted by the US after this 
intervention claimed that this was their reaction to the Bush administration and its policies, not to 
the US in general. In the 1960s and 1970s, people around the world expressed their objections to 
America’s war in Vietnam, which meant that the US lost some of its international popularity. 
These examples show that the international community saw American policies separately from 
its people and culture. People in most nations in the world still admire American technology, 
movies, television and other cultural values. In the meantime, they also express their objections 
or dislike to some of its foreign policies and the growing influence of the US in their country. As 
these wars have receded into the past and different administrations have pursued different 
policies, the US has gradually recovered much of its lost soft power.  
3. Limitation of soft power 
Although soft power has many advantages, it also has certain limitations. People who object to 
using soft power argue that governments are hardly in full control of the attraction.19 Most of 
American soft power is brought about by Hollywood, Harvard, Microsoft, etc. but the 
government cannot or should not have control over culture. In fact, in some cases, it is the 
absence of policies of control which can itself produce soft power. When firms, universities, 
foundations, churches and other non-governmental groups carry out their own activities to 
develop soft power, they at the same time may reinforce or be at odds with official foreign 
policies.20 Consequently, governments need to be certain that their actions and policies would 
“reinforce rather than undercut the soft power”.21  Furthermore, soft power appears to be more 
helpful in the realization of such goals as promoting democracy, human rights and opening 
markets than in preventing attack, policing borders and protecting allies. Those latter goals 
should rest mainly on hard power.  It means that soft power alone cannot bring comprehensive 
                                                             
19 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004 
20 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2004 
21 Ibid, p.17 
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power to any countries. It is only when soft and hard power are deployed flexibly and creatively 
that a country can become a superpower in the world. 
II. AMERICAN SOFT POWER IN ASIA SINCE THE COLD WAR 
When mentioning the U.S as a superpower, people seem to pay much attention to the economic 
and military aspects of its power. However, soft power is increasingly recognized as bringing 
“essential components of Great Power status” to the U.S.22 It has also been noted: "Soft power 
has been a strong suit for the United States virtually from its inception – certainly long before the 
country became a recognized world power in the twentieth century. American “exceptionalism” 
– the nation’s devotion to freedom, the rule of law, and the practice of republican government, its 
openness to immigrants of all races and religions, its opposition to traditional power politics and 
imperialism – has had a great deal to do with the rise of the United States to its currently 
dominant global role."23 The United States has long had a great deal of soft power, which is 
created partly by governments and partly by societal forces outside governments. Within the 
Asian region, according to a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia 
Institute of South Korea, the soft power of the United States ranks first for Chinese, Japanese and 
South Koreans. This reflects the positive fact that U.S. influence in Asia has strong roots and it is 
not doing so badly in Asia.   
1. Popular culture 
It has been previously mentioned that culture is an important source of soft power. As 
Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew put it, “soft power is achieved when other nations 
admire and want to emulate aspects of that nation’s civilization”24 and yet, the U.S seems to have 
had more advantages in expanding this influence. It is not difficult to see the U.S. government’s 
efforts in utilizing its culture to create soft power since their first government came into power. 
In the late 1930s under the Roosevelt Administration, politicians and policy-makers became 
convinced that “America’s security depended on its ability to speak to and to win the support of 
                                                             
22 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limites of Chinese Soft Power, Survival, Volume 48 Number 2, 
Summer 2006, P.17-36. 
23 Carnes Lord, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, in Waller, ed., Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, 
Counterpropaganda and Political Warfare, IWP Press, 2008, p 61. 
24 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limites of Chinese Soft Power, Survival, Volume 48 Number 2, 
Summer 2006, P.17 
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people in other countries”.25 Therefore, since the end of World War II and the Cold War, U.S. 
governments paid more attention and invested more in popularizing its culture through official 
channels such as the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America, the Fulbright 
program, American libraries, lectures and other programs. There has been growing international 
interest in American culture. Outside the United States, the term “Americanization” has been 
used since at least 1907 to express the influence of the United States on the culture of other 
countries, in particular, their popular culture, language, cuisine, technology, business practices, 
and political techniques.  
As for popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment, it makes the US seem to others 
“exciting, exotic, rich, powerful, tend-setting- the cutting edge of modernity and innovation. 
American pop culture is by turns sexy and violent and glamorous and materialistic and 
romantic”26. According to Nye, “culture is transmitted through personal contacts, visits and 
exchanges”. It cannot be denied that the United States gains many benefits from its universalistic 
culture. Since the late 19th century, there has been a dramatic development of U.S cultural 
industries.  Hollywood, its stars and films, the American television industry, the iconography of 
American sports and counter culture in fashion, fast food, rock and rap has dominated most of 
the world's markets. It is the chief medium through which people across the globe see American 
fashions, customs, scenery and way of life.27 In other words, these immediate, fast and visible 
channels of media have helped to spread American values all over the world. Moreover, U.S.-
based TV programs, many of which are transmitted both through American broadcasters and 
their subsidiaries such as HBO Asia, CNBC Europe and CNN International, are re-broadcast 
around the world. Many of these distributors mainly broadcast American programming on their 
TV channels. According to a recent survey by the influential British broadcast media magazine 
Radio Times, American films are extremely popular around the world, often dominating 
international cinemas with CSI being the most watched television show among the surveyed 20 
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countries.28 Moreover, the highest grossing film of all time is “Gone with the Wind”, which is 
also an American product. All in all, motion pictures, radio and language have not only been able 
to sell their products but they also help to introduce America’s culture and values, “the secret of 
its success”, to the world. 
Regarding the American-English language, US TOEFL examination, the most widely accepted, 
respected, most popular and most convenient choice of English-language test in the world has 
seen an annual increase in examinees. The TOEFL test is now recognized by more than 8,500 
colleges, universities and agencies in more than 130 countries. In regards to education in general, 
higher education produces significant soft power for the US. Since World War II, U.S. 
universities have educated quite a few generations of Asian professionals and elites.29 Foreign 
student enrollments in the US have seen dramatic growth. The 2013 Open Doors Report on 
International Educational Exchange found “the number of international students at colleges and 
universities in the United States increased by seven percent to a record high of 819,644 students 
in the 2012 and 2013 academic year”, which means that there were 55,000 more international 
students than in 2011 and 2012.30 Secretary of State Colin Power said in 2001 “I can think of no 
more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been 
educated here”31. Some educators say that the US remains the top choice for many students. 
Many Asian parents now think that it is necessary for their children to study English and to 
enroll in U.S. higher education to ensure their success in the future. The growth in foreign 
enrollments also reflects the role of the US as a cultural magnet. It appears too early to gauge the 
influence of this academic training on future generations. However, their experience in the US 
will likely open their minds to American worldviews and interests.32 Meanwhile, it increases the 
opportunities both to influence and learn from foreign students. Especially, when many of these 
U.S. former students occupy certain political positions, they can, to a certain extent, affect policy 
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outcomes that are important to Americans.33 Therefore, the US government has invested billions 
of dollars on soft power including the State Department’s public diplomacy programs and 
international broadcasting. A former French Minister said that the Americans are powerful 
because they can “inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global 
images through films and television and because for these same reasons, large numbers of 
students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies”.34  
2. Domestic political values and policies 
Regarding domestic values, ideas and policies, US’s soft power depends on how it implements 
its values and policies domestically. This may involve a number of core ideals and values 
relating to liberty, equality, democracy, unity and diversity. As for liberty, it can be understood 
as the freedom for people to do what they want and is essential for personal fulfillment and 
happiness. Examples include Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four freedoms” articulated on January 6, 
1941. These include “Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Worship, Freedom from Want, and 
Freedom from Fear” that he said people “everywhere in the world’ ought to enjoy. The first two 
Freedoms are protected by the first Amendment in the United States Constitution, while the latter 
two Freedoms went beyond the traditional Constitutional values protected by the U.S. Bill of 
Rights. Moreover, to a certain extent, liberty may include economic liberty as well, which means 
that people are free to do anything they see fit in the economic sphere without government’s 
intervention. Equality refers to ways in which people are treated the same. The United States is 
famous for its political equality, which means everyone has the same status under law. 
Moreover, Americans are well-known for having equal opportunity. This means everybody gets 
the same opportunities to complete and equal opportunity to succeed. The next value that helps 
to create much of American soft power is Democracy. This value in American political culture 
is usually found in domestic politics but at the same time, it has sometimes spread to other 
countries that drive American foreign policies. For example, American foreign policy during the 
Cold War often aimed at supporting and spreading democracy around the world. Democracy also 
means a government by the people, meaning that political leaders are supposed to listen to and to 
heed public opinion. The United States’ Presidential election is a typical example of the right of 
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the people to exercise their power over government. Finally yet importantly, Unity and 
Diversity are two interconnected ideals in American political culture. The name of the country-
the United States-emphasizes the importance of unity to its national political culture. Unity also 
refers to Americans’ support of the Republic and Democracy even if they disagree with one 
another about policies. It is not so hard to realize that the American democratic model has been 
the inspiration for many Asian countries in their transitional periods from authoritarian to 
democratic political systems.35 Diversity refers to the fact that Americans have many different 
cultural traditions and hold a variety of values. Nearly all Americans descend from immigrants 
and many of them take pride in their heritage and cultural history. The ethnic, religious and 
cultural diversity brought in by immigrants in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has shaped 
much of American history and politics. The fact that the U.S has brought in many immigrants 
also expresses American attractiveness. Many opinion polls suggest that many people in 
different countries in the world like American values, American society and even American 
people.  
3. Foreign policies  
Beside popular culture and domestic political values and policies, U.S. soft power is also built on 
the basis of its foreign policies towards the region of Asia. Foreign policies build up a country’s 
soft power only when “they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority”. U.S. foreign 
policies can produce soft power to the extent that those policies help to promote peace and 
human rights.36 After the Cold War, the U.S was no longer as powerful as it used to be, 
especially in economic terms, due to trade and budget deficits. According to Nye, despite these 
problems, the position of the U.S in Asia is not being challenged thanks to its strategies for 
adjusting its foreign policies to changes in the international context.  
First, there is the emergence of multilateralism. Many Washington policy-makers realized that it 
was necessary to have a new mechanism to deal with emerging challenges in the region. After 
the Cold War, some Asian countries began to express their opposition to U.S. intervention in the 
region. In this context, the development of multilateralism was considered a suitable strategy to 
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maintain the U.S. presence in the region as well as to promote Washington’s status and 
reputation in comparison to other major and powerful actors in the region. Unlike the George 
Bush Administration, the majority of policy-makers in the Clinton Administration welcomed this 
trend of multilateralism as a supplement to the existing bilateral arrangements. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the United States of America has supported the strengthening of such existing 
multilateral forums as APEC and at the creation of new multilateral mechanisms like the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).37 In the Asia-Pacific region, the multilateral system of 
international relations was initiated and dominated by weak states, not by major powers in the 
region. Although Washington did not initiate this process, it played a crucial role in the 
emergence of multilateralism in the region.  Therefore, the ARF offers a way for the U.S to 
engage with the region as well as to restrain such rising powers as China. In a speech to the 
Korean National Assembly in July 1993, Clinton expressed his support for security dialogues 
among Asia-Pacific countries. President Clinton also proposed some security activities from the 
multilateral discussions on specific issues to confidence-building measures including discussions 
on theories of defense, transparency in arms procurement and conflict management. This marked 
a turning point in U.S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. 
Second, U.S. soft power has also gained from the revival of the old model in US - East Asia 
relations. Although there is a rise in multilateralism, the overwhelmingly bilateral approach of 
the United States in the region was clearly reflected through the "Joint Declaration Japan - U.S. 
Security: Alliance for the 21st Century" on April 16, 1996. It is obvious that Washington's top 
priorities were basically unchanged. These priorities include U.S-Japan security ties, America's 
commitment to stability on the Korean peninsula and long-standing friendly relations of the U.S. 
with Australia and New Zealand. Both the Clinton and George W.Bush Administrations put 
emphasis on the role of bilateral approaches to foreign policy for the Asia-Pacific region.  
Moreover, in the second half of the twentieth century, the U.S advanced their values by creating 
a structure of international rules and instructions consistent with the liberal and democratic 
nature of American economic systems including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN). U.S. intervention in the region 
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through these institutions aimed to “(1) uphold state integrity/sovereignty; (2) promote/enforce 
human rights practices; or (3) forestall/contain the negative and dysfunctional aspects of 
globalization processes in developing countries”. “Institutions provide the legitimacy of power 
relations, articulate the hegemonic mission of the powerful, and appeal for the cooperation of the 
weak”.38 Thanks to such institutions as the IMF or WTO, the U.S. image of global economic 
relations has been universalized. Similarly, many regional conflict situations have been handled 
within the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council.  
Last but not least, American soft power is expressed through its active participation in Asia-
Pacific trade. It is clear that many America’s trading partners in the region have a deep interest in 
the extension of trade promotion authority. This would keep the United States engaged in trade 
initiatives as well as maintaining active U.S participation in the region.39 Often part of the 
negotiating in free trade agreements between the U.S. and other nations involves tariffs. Recently 
South Korea has agreed to reduce its quota under pressure from the U.S. as part of a free trade 
deal.  
In conclusion, according to most recent surveys, U.S. soft power in Asia remains about the same 
or increased. A record 62 million foreign tourists visited USA in 2011, some 1.04 million 
immigrants applied for permanent residency in 2010, following 1.13 million in the previous year 
and reflecting the world’s faith in the American brand. The people of the world in general and in 
Asia in particular still believe that the USA is the place to visit, to reside in, and to prosper. As 
Jennie S. Bev said, “the American brand is still the best out there”.40 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
38 Earl Conteh-Morgan, International Intervention: Conflict, Economic Relocation, and the Hegemonic Role of 
Dominant Actor,  The International Journal of Peace Studies 
39 C. Fred Bergsten, Toward a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific,  Policy Briefs in International Economics, 
February 2007 
40 http://jenniesbev.typepad.com. 
22 
 
 
 CHAPTER II: US STRATEGIC REBALANCING TO ASIA 
I. AN HISTORICAL VIEW ON THE REBALANCING STRATEGY 
Both historically and in the contemporary age, the Asia-Pacific region has been a focal point of 
American interests. Therefore, since coming to power, the Obama Administration has 
continuously tried to refine U.S security strategy in Asia-Pacific. The “pivot” was not announced 
right at the beginning of Obama’s time in power because the government at that time had to pay 
more attention to the domestic financial crisis and the consequences of the Iraq War. But with 
this so-called “pivot”, the Obama Administration has written a new chapter in U.S. foreign 
policy, saying that the United States will now shift their focus from the two wars in Southwest 
Asia to the emerging power of China. The "Return to Asia" was first officially mentioned by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in “-Foreign Policy-” magazine in 2011 and became the 
concept orienting President Obama's visit to Hawaii, Australia and Indonesia in November 2011. 
Since then, this strategy has undergone several major adjustments especially in the concept of the 
strategy. Since it came into being in 2010, this strategy has been described by several names 
from the U.S “return”, strategic “pivot” or “rebalancing to Asia”. In general, these three terms all 
aim at describing the new prioritization in the foreign and national security policy of the United 
States. Since its appearance, the strategy has drawn many comments from abroad. However, it 
seems to attract less domestic commentary in the U.S. Many of these comments are directed at 
the term “pivot”. By using this term, the implication is that the US would downgrade other 
regions in the world, especially Southwest Asia, the Middle East and Europe, in its priorities. In 
that context, the Obama Administration had to try “to recast the new initiative as a “rebalancing” 
without “abandoning” long-standing commitments elsewhere in the world”.41 In theory, all 
important new strategies are often referred to as means and methods to solve new challenges to 
national interest or achieve certain purposes. The “rebalancing” to Asia policy itself was not a 
result of a long and cautious policymaking process. Instead, it was the result of emerging 
situations concerning military strategy and unexpected developments in Asia. 
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 First, there is the important position of the Asia-Pacific region in the world. The Asia-Pacific 
region has the largest population in the world. It is also the region where there are many 
economies with the most active development and where most of the wealth of the world is based. 
At the same time, this region is also one of the areas where there is a dense military presence, the 
greatest potential of military development and the most serious nuclear proliferation in the world. 
In both economic and security terms, the Asia-Pacific region is becoming increasingly important 
for the U.S. 
Second, Asia is the most important region for the national interests of the United States. Hillary 
Clinton declared that America's future is mainly related to this region, and in turn, the future of 
the region will be influenced by the United States.  Economically, the U.S has no way to avoid 
this close tie. For example, the  United  States has  important  trade  and  investment  ties  with 
Australia,  Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and 
 Vietnam. In  2011,  trade exports  and  imports  of  goods  and  services  with  these above-
mentioned countries  “supported  an  estimated  14.9  million American  jobs”.42 The Scottish 
economic historian Angus Maddison said that Asia is once again becoming the economic center 
of the world after 200 years.43 This process began with the industrial revolution and the fall of 
the Qing Empire in China. Recent polls of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identified Asia 
as the most important region in the world for the U.S.  James J. Przystup, an expert on U.S. 
international affairs, summarized U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific as falling into 6 categories: 
(1) protecting the interests of U.S. citizens in Asia; (2) protecting U.S. markets in this area; (3) 
ensuring the freedom and security of marine transportation; (4) maintaining the regional balance 
of power; (5) preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (6) and promoting 
democracy and human rights.44  
Thirdly, this policy also sends a political message from the U.S government. Bob Woodward, a 
Washington Post journalist said that senior officials of the White House have been trying to look 
for reasons to promote the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Moreover, the strategic 
direction in January 2012 of the Pentagon confirmed that the U.S. military should pay more 
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attention to East Asia after a decade of combat in Southwest Asia. Therefore, this priority is quite 
in accordance with U.S future missions. It is also a means for the government to deal with the 
problem that the U.S needs further cuts in its defense budget. 
Apart from their interests in the region, Americans are now also facing several challenges. In 
"Strategic Report on Asia-Pacific Security” of the U.S, it is clearly stated that, in the past 10 
years, there have been 4 fundamental changes in the region. Firstly, the political power and 
economic growth of this region have increased rapidly in comparison with other regions in the 
world. Currently, Asia-Pacific’s exports account for 30% of total world exports. The annual trade 
turnover between Asia-Pacific and the U.S. exceeded US$1000 billion and the region’s foreign 
reserves account for two thirds of the world’s total. Secondly, the rise of China on the one hand 
brings about economic opportunities for neighboring countries but, on the other hand, makes 
them feel worried and anxious. Next, there is the increasing number of regional countries 
possessing nuclear weapons, the pursuit of non-governmental organizations for weapons of mass 
destruction and the deployment of American ballistic missile defense systems in the region. 
These high risks could be seen in North Korea, Iran, India or Pakistan. All of these are likely to 
lead to a more and more acute arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the issue of 
nuclear proliferation does not only affect the stability of the region but also stimulates the 
determination of Japan and South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, and even causes harms to 
the relationship between the U.S. and its two allies. Finally, Americans also see numerous threats 
emanating from this region such as financial crises, environment problems and transnational 
infectious diseases. Hillary Clinton used to comment that Asia is not only the region of emerging 
countries, but also a place of governments being isolated by the international community. She 
also said that not only long-term challenges exist in this region; there are also unprecedented 
threats that the U.S has to face at the same time. Thus, in order to deal with these challenges 
among which the most prominent is the rise of China, it is better to increase new opportunities 
rather than to add new challenges.  
Indeed, this policy is perceived by many to be the U.S response to Chinese assertiveness. In 
general, the U.S strategic ‘rebalancing” to Asia-Pacific is a combination of continued 
engagement with China dating back to the Nixon Administration in 1972 and the continuation of 
a power rebalancing strategy of former Presidents. Furthermore, the Obama Administration 
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through this policy hopes to have more strategic commitments as well as to strengthen relations 
with Chinese leaders. On the other hand, the U.S. Department of Defense in January 2012 
confirmed the military threat of China and referred to the U.S ability to resist the probable 
attacks of the Chinese military.45 
The policy also helps to strengthen U.S power to a certain extent. In fact, it dates back to a 
decade ago when the United States began to strengthen its power in the Asia-Pacific region. At 
that time, the purposes of the U.S were to reduce pressure on the U.S. bases on Okinawa Island 
and to cope with the increasing challenges of low intensity conflict in Southeast Asia as well as 
anti-access-area denial (A2AD) challenges growing in Northeast Asia.46 It is clear that the 
strengthening of U.S power is not new, but it has become more pressing in the context of larger 
strategic policy when the U.S. Congress blocked any proposals to increase the budget for the 
military forces.  
The United States also wanted to signal greater engagement in Southeast Asia to the world. Since 
President Obama’s election, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed her great interest in this 
sub-region and actively participated in the multilateral diplomacy of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), with a special emphasis on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the 
same time, President Obama fully embraced the organizational structure of the region with a 
strategic focus on ASEAN. Asia has many multilateral regional organizations, from the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to the smaller three-party forum involving the 
U.S, Japan and Australia. National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon has stated that “The United 
States is not only re-balancing to the Asia-Pacific, we are re-balancing within Asia to recognize 
the growing importance of Southeast Asia… Just as we found that the United States was 
underweighted in East Asia, we found that the United States was especially underweighted in 
Southeast Asia. And we are correcting that”. The ASEAN members are trying to promote 
"ASEAN's central role" in this process and President Obama expressed his support for this by 
attending the East Asia Summit (EAS) in two consecutive years-a significant symbolic gesture. 
This action makes regional countries hope that APEC will continue to be a strong trans-Pacific 
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organization in the region, and the President's commitment to EAS might be the most powerful 
one in the “Return to Asia” policy. In fact, enhancing its engagement in Southeast Asia means to 
develop the entire U.S. strategy, to emphasize the growing importance of ASEAN as an 
important trading partner of the U.S. and as a target for influence competition between the U.S. 
and China. Kurt M. Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific, said in 
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the 
Pacific that “it is clear that America’s success in the 21st century is tied to the success of the 
dynamic Asia-Pacific region. As Secretary Clinton has noted, much of the history of the 21st 
century will be written in Asia”.47  It means that in the Asia-Pacific Century, the United States 
should strengthen and have more insightful leadership and engagement in this area. In particular, 
in this rebalancing strategy, the main objectives are to strengthen their leadership and influence 
in Asia-Pacific region. 
In fact, the Asia pivot is both new and not new. This policy is not new because the Asia-Pacific 
region has long been a priority for the US.48 Historically, the position of the region in the U.S’s 
priorities varied in different contexts. In the 18th and 19th Centuries, the Asia-Pacific region 
ranked second only to the priority of protecting land borders of the U.S. In the 20th century, in 
the second Bush Administration, due to the U.S commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and the 
Middle East peace process, U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region was rather limited.  In the 
first and second Obama Administrations, this region has once again become a top priority. It 
means that the Asia-Pacific has never  dropped out of U.S priorities but it has not always been 
the highest one. With this “rebalancing” strategy, the U.S “has embarked on a qualitatively new 
strategic prioritization by emphasizing and increasing resources devoted to diplomacy, 
commerce and security in the Asia-Pacific region”.49 In that sense, the policy is new for the U.S 
because the U.S has long prioritized its transatlantic ties, the Middle East or previously Latin 
America. In the Vietnam War and the Cold War, it was not the Asia-Pacific but the Western 
front, the Cold War confrontation in Europe versus the Soviet Union, which was the main 
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priority.50 Since 2001, the U.S has tended to focus on “wars in terrorism” in Southwest Asia and 
the Middle East.  
The obvious fact is that the shift we are witnessing is a relative, not a fundamental one.51 In 
reality, the U.S has had deep involvement in Asia for many centuries. The United States has long 
been a Pacific Power, which was marked in the wake of the Spanish-American Was in 1898 with 
the “Open Door Notes” in 1899-1900 of Secretary of State John Hay. Long before then, the 
sailing of the ship “Empress of China” in 1784 from New York to Guangzhou, China made the 
U.S become an important actor in the region. From that time on, a U.S diplomatic, cultural and 
religious presence has been present in East Asia. In turn, more and more Asian have come to live 
in the United States. It may be argued that the U.S involvement in the region “is anchored on five 
enduring bilateral alliances, a series of strong strategic partnerships, intensive bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy, deep cultural ties, enormous “soft power”, and a growing Asian-
American population”.52 From that, it is clear that the US has been an Asian-Pacific nation by its 
legitimacy of geography, ethnicity, commerce, culture, diplomacy and security engagements. 
Consequently, the “rebalancing” strategy is not so new for the U.S and for Asian countries.   
II. THE POLICY COMPONENTS 
Since coming to power, the Obama Administration has continued to make certain adjustments to 
the Asia-Pacific strategic policy to make it become more effective and practical.  The U.S 
government has been trying to work to build a bipartisan consensus on the importance of 
engaging the Asia-Pacific region and advancing U.S. interests there. Its policy toward East Asia 
and the Pacific reflects the profound recognition of the US that the prosperity and security future 
of the US depends deeply on regional developments as well as events happening here. In the 
context that the region is undergoing a period of rapid growth and transformation, U.S. 
commitments here become increasingly essential. The U.S. commitments to the Asia-Pacific 
region are demonstrated in a number of ways. The Obama Administration has set out a 5-part 
framework for engagement in this region. First, the U.S has to deepen and modernize their 
alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. Next is to 
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broaden their engagement with increasingly important partners like Indonesia, Vietnam, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, and most notably India. Third, to deal with an 
emerging great power in the region, the U.S. needs to “develop a predictable, stable, and 
comprehensive relationship with China”. The fourth is to “engage and invest in the region’s 
burgeoning multilateral architecture. The fifth is to “pursue a confident and aggressive trade and 
economic strategy”.53 Until now, most countries in this region seem only see the strategy through 
the angle of security and defense-related cooperation. However, security and defense-related 
cooperation is only a part of the policy and the larger context of U.S. engagement with the region 
is reflected through non-military issues including economic and cultural interests and foreign 
policies or diplomacy. Therefore, though the U.S security and defense commitments in the 
region are still strong so far, the U.S. has to pay more attention to strengthening its non-military 
engagement at the same time. 
1.  Economic interests 
In order to understand the economic interests of the U.S in the region and how the U.S. 
government might enhance its economic engagement through this strategy, it is necessary to 
determine how important East Asia and the Pacific are to the United States economically. Asia 
has been the most important economic partner of the U.S for more than three decades. It 
surpassed Europe in 1977 to become the country’s leading trade partner, with China and Japan 
now the second and third largest trade partners. By 2010, the region accounted for 32.2 percent 
of U.S total merchandise trade worldwide. In 2012, the U.S. trade with Asia was 14.2 trillion 
dollars. Since 2000, the Asia-Pacific region has become the largest source of imports and the 
second largest export market of the U.S. exports to Asia in 2012 were 457.2 billion dollars. Nine 
out of 20 U.S. national export markets are located in Asia. The growth in exports to China has 
been the fastest for the past 5 years. U.S. exports to Asia contribute approximately 5% to its 
Gross Domestic Products (GDP), which helps to create millions of jobs domestically per annum. 
U.S investment in East Asia has grown from $22.5 billion in 2009 to $41.4 billion in 2011. 54 
From all the data above, it is not difficult to see that U.S. economic and commercial ties to the 
Asian- Pacific are becoming deeper and deeper. 
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Consequently, the U.S. government has demonstrated its commitments through intensive 
economic engagement in the region. At the fifth meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Washington in July 2013, Secretary Kerry and Treasury 
Secretary Lew, as President Obama’s Special Representatives were joined for the Dialogue by 
their Chinese counterparts to discuss challenges and opportunities both countries face on 
bilateral, regional, and global issues of immediate and long-term economic and strategic 
interests. This bilateral Dialogue was based on mutual respect, win-win cooperation, no conflict 
and no confrontation into every aspect of China-US relations. It was hoped that greater economic 
engagement in the region might enable the U.S. to deepen trust, expand economic cooperation 
and manage differences with a new mindset. 
Moreover, since Asia’s stability and security future relate closely to its prosperity and economic 
development, the U.S. government is trying to boost its trade in the region by increasing 
investment flows and U.S. exports to the region. These would not only benefit U.S. businesses 
but also help to create more jobs at home and at the same time create more inclusive 
development outcomes for the region itself.55 As Asia’s prosperity is America’s prosperity then it 
is necessary for the U.S to continue to secure Asian markets for U.S. goods and services. Thus, 
the future establishment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement with 11 partners 
will be “one of the cornerstones of our “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific”.56 Thanks to its 
more active participation in such regional multilateral mechanism as the TPP and APEC, U.S. 
businesses gain enhanced access to this dynamic region and further integrate the regional 
economy under a set of high-standard trade and investment rules.  
2. Cultural Interests 
Beside economic integration, another important thing the U.S has to do to realize the rebalancing 
strategy is to increase its cultural impact across Asia. As stated previously, a key form of cultural 
engagement of US in the region is education, especially higher education. Thus, the U.S. 
government has spent much of its budget on building more modern universities and professional 
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schools both inside and outside America to create more spaces for international students, 
especially Asian ones. American lecturers and university professors not only teach in American 
schools but also in a number of Asian universities and vocational schools in China, Singapore, 
Vietnam, etc. Moreover, the Department of State continues to sponsor such educational 
programs as the Fulbright Program or International Leadership Programs to create more 
opportunities for US professors, students and young political leaders to come to Asia as well as 
for Asians fellows to go to the US to teach and study. 
In order to promote its positive cultural engagement in Asia, beside education, popular culture 
such as films, sports, music and literature also play an important role. This promises to be an 
effective channel to advertise the American image to the world in a soft way without having to 
use “sticks and carrots”. Thanks to the existence of the forty-year general color-blind US 
immigration policy since the ending of US restrictions on Asian immigration in 1965, millions of 
Asian have made the U.S their home country and interact with their countries of origin in a way 
that supports the US position in Asia.57 This remains a positive channel that the U.S government 
needs to deploy in implementing the rebalancing strategy towards Asia.  
3. Foreign Policies 
There was a time in history when U.S. diplomatic attention to the Asia-Pacific region was 
limited, especially to Southeast Asia. Before the Obama Administration, it was not difficult to 
see the limited U.S. interest in the region. However, since President Obama took office, he 
realized the increasingly important role of the Asia-Pacific region for U.S. core interests and the 
whole world as well. Accordingly, he “has made Asia the top U.S foreign policy priority and 
made important adjustments to U.S foreign policies.58 In his first four years in office, President 
Obama made four visits to this region, which could be seen as a political signal to the world. The 
Secretary of State at that time, Hillary Clinton broke the tradition of the U.S. Secretary of State 
to pay her first visit to Europe. Instead, she initially visited Asia and returned many times in the 
four years of her term. Clinton said the U.S. is currently involved in regional countries by 
deploying diplomatic measures. The fact that President Obama was the first U.S. president to 
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attend the East Asia Summit along with regional nations in the efforts to pursue comprehensive 
solutions to a wide range of issues from non-proliferation of nuclear weapon, maritime security 
to disaster response is a clear example of deeper diplomatic engagement and commitment of the 
U.S to the region. Furthermore, the U.S has recently shown more of its participation in such 
regional organizations as ASEAN and APEC, which also reflects the support and strong 
commitment of the U.S. to the forums aiming at discussing regional security and political issues. 
In President Obama’s speech at the Australian Parliament on 17 November 2011, he affirmed 
that, “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its 
future”.   
The U.S government also emphasizes the significance of multilateral cooperation and the role of 
dialogues in such mechanisms. Within this rebalancing policy, the U.S. wishes to promote its 
greater role in existing cooperation mechanisms. At the same time, it also opposes the 
establishment of new regional mechanisms because of the worry that other large powers might 
construct new structures to eliminate the role of the U.S in the region. The establishment of new 
mechanisms may also make the situation in Asia more complex and cause harmful damage to 
U.S. interests in this region. By successfully hosting the 17th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
leaders meeting (APEC) in 2011, the U.S achieved its engagement purposes in regional activities 
to a certain extent. Moreover, the U.S government seeks to strengthen its flexibility and 
creativity when participating in multilateral cooperation mechanisms in the region. An example 
can be seen in the activeness of the Obama Administration in developing relations with the 
countries in the Mekong River Basin (the Lower Mekong Initiative of the Department of State), 
as well as continuing the trilateral strategic dialogue with Japan and Australia, Japan and South 
Korea. The U.S government’s present hope is to be able to build trilateral dialogue between 
China-US-Japan and Japan-US-India. 
At a local level, it is not difficult to see a new proactivity of U.S. embassies and diplomats. 
Secretary Clinton called this new diplomatic engagement “forward deployed diplomacy”. She 
also outlined six elements of this regional diplomacy in a Foreign Policy magazine article. These 
include: 
 “strengthening bilateral security alliances; 
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 deepening working relationships with emerging powers, including China; 
 engaging regional multilateral institutions; 
 expanding trade and investment; 
 forging a broad-based military presence; and 
 advancing democracy and human rights.”59 
Beside multilateral diplomacy, the U.S. government has also focused on bilateral relations with 
every country in the region from New Zealand, Indonesia and the Philippines to smaller states. 
The U.S has a strong diplomatic focus on regional emerging powers such as India and China. 
Regarding China, the two countries annually have more than 60 annual official dialogue 
mechanisms 60 and the U.S sends the largest of its diplomatic contingents to its embassy in 
Beijing. Regarding India, the U.S hopes to develop a “defining partnership of the 21st century” 
with deeper and more expanding bilateral interactions. All in all, since Asia is a region of 
political, economic, religious, ethnical, cultural and military diversity, U.S foreign policies 
should not only be integrative but also respectful and appreciative of intra-regional differences to 
be successful in this rebalancing strategy. 
4. Security Engagement 
Within the strategic rebalance towards Asia, the U.S hoped to help maintain regional security 
and stability. This may help to ensure U.S. fundamental economic, cultural and diplomatic 
interests in this important area. According to Nye, the U.S contribution to regional security can 
be considered as the “oxygen” for the region.61 The security engagement of the U.S is manifested 
in at least four dimensions: “(1) preventing the rise of a regional hegemon hostile to US interests; 
(2) preventing major power rivalry and polarization of the region; (3) preventing internal 
political-socioeconomic crises from spilling outside national border, thus causing destabilizing 
effects in the region; and (4) enabling working relationships with others to jointly manage an 
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increasing range of transnational nontraditional security challenges.”62 Following these 
approaches, the U.S. government planned to increase its military presence in the Asia-Pacific. At 
present, the U.S has “approximately 325,000 military and civilian personnel…approximately 180 
ships and submarines, 1,500 aircraft, and 100,000 personnel. The US military stations 16,000 
personnel at sea, 40,000 in Japan, 28,500 in South Korea, 500 (rotationally) in the Philippines, 
4,500 in Guam (to grow to 9,000), and 250 Marines in ” in Australia (to grow to 2,500)”.63 
According to Hillary Clinton, every day there are about 50 ships, hundreds of aircrafts and tens 
thousands of marines operating in the Asia-Pacific region. Each year, the U.S. Navy participates 
in 170 multilateral and bilateral military rehearsals and the U.S. Navy ships have made more 
than 250 visits to regional ports. 
Next, the U.S is striving to reinforce its bilateral alliance system with Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia because these are the major alliance relationships 
for the United States to rely on in maintaining and developing its influence in the Asia-Pacific 
region. In February 2009, the U.S. and Japan signed the "International Agreement on Guam" 
concerning the implementation of the relocation of the marine expeditionary force from Okinawa 
to Guam which may facilitate the deployment of troops outside the U.S. more effectively and 
also helps to implement strategic deterrence in Asia-Pacific. In addition, the U.S. actively 
cooperates with South Korea in seeking to convince North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons, 
encouraging South Korea to promote its positive role in maintaining regional security and 
stability in the Northeast Asia. 
Referring to regional security issues, regarding freedom of sea transportation in the South China 
Sea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed that the U.S. does not take any sides in these 
territorial disputes, but the U.S. supports a peaceful solution to this matter. The U.S clearly 
understands that the South China Sea is one of the most dynamic areas of international maritime 
traffic where half of the world's goods pass through, so the maritime security and freedom of 
transportation here is particularly important. Therefore, the U.S supports the construction of an 
effective Code of Conduct (COC), which respects the interests of the parties involved and 
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ensures that the dispute will be resolved through a continuous process based on principles of 
international law. 
 
 
CHAPTER III: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON U.S STRATEGIC REBALANCING 
I. CHINA AS AN EMERGING COMPREHENSIVE POWER IN THE REGION 
Strategic cooperation between China and the United Stated dates back to the 1970s under Mao 
Zedong and Richard Nixon. Therefore, the rebalancing strategy of the Obama Administration has 
elements of continuity with the U.S.’s “engagement with China” but this strategy appears softer 
and clearer. Apart from American eagerness to improve its global image, it is said that the 
strategic rebalancing aims at constraining China because of “the challenges and opportunities 
presented by an increasingly powerful and influential China” as well as its unprecedented 
development.64 The United States perceives this emerging power as “a threat to the U.S.’s 
superpower status, and regional stability”.65  U.S strategy towards Asia in general and China in 
particular seems to attract most interest. At the same time, this is also a very hot topic in China 
and it is of value to analyse Chinese responses to this rebalancing policy through the perspectives 
of Chinese political researchers, diplomatic discourse and in practice. 
According to the Online Asia Times, two years after the U.S announced the rebalancing strategy 
towards the Asia-Pacific, China seems to have outlined a two-sided strategy in response to the 
“rebalance”, which is becoming more apparent recently. On the one hand, China has pursued 
engagement with Southeast Asia and  Central Asian countries through the sigining of investment, 
infrastructure construction and other free trade agreements. On the other hand, China expresses 
increasingly tougher attitudes towards the Philippines and Japan, which are U.S. allies and are 
also moving closer to each other in order to “calm down” China in the region. In general, 
Chinese officials state that they will certainly respond to a strategy that confronts China but 
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welcome an “intervention” or “engagement” strategy. An example of China’s response can be 
seen through the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Indentification Zone (AIDZ) 
of Beijing in December 2013, “which is in consistent with Beijing’s long-term strategy of 
asserting control in the region”.66  
Chinese realists argue that there are two factors that led to the U.S decision to shift towards the 
Asia-Pacific region. The first and more important factor is China. With this policy, the U.S hopes 
to take advantage of other economically developed countries in the region to balance China.67 
China with its rapid present development is supposed to be a fast rising challenger to the U.S. 
superpower status in the world. The second factor driving this policy results from the “possible 
shift of the world center from Europe to East Asia”.68 It is the rise of China that has brought 
about the possibility that Europe and North America will be replaced by East Asia as the 
economic and political center of the world in the world balance of power. As a result, it seems to 
be better for the U.S to find ways to strengthen its position in this region rather than be deeply 
involved in wars on terror that continue weakening its global leadership. It is also believed that 
“containing, soft containing, balancing, rebalancing, isolating or encirclement of China” is 
another aim of this strategy.69 Chinese political researchers also agree that in order to develop 
strategic cooperation between Beijing and Washington, it is nescessary for both sides to build 
mutual trust. Without this condition, bilateral relations between the two powers may entail many 
risks, especially the risk of military conflicts. Thus, the most effective way to improve this 
bilateral relationship is through communication. An example can be seen in the priority given to 
the role of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). In the context that China 
hopes to become a superpower perhaps only second to the U.S and the U.S wants to maintain its 
sole superpower status in the world, in order to avoid military clashes between two nuclear 
powerful countries, U.S.-China cooperation should be a mutual priority. Some Chinese realists 
call this “preventive cooperation”, which can be understood as cooperation based on the 
foundation of common, shared and complementary interests without interference into domestic 
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matters of the two countries.These interests may include nuclear nonproliferation, peace in the 
Asia-Pacific, counterterrorism in Central Asia, trade and investment, etc.70 
However, in official forums and diplomatic discourse, this is not the way that the U.S. strategy in 
directly mentioned. Officially, Chinese leaders and authorities express their welcome to more 
involvement and engagement and their hope for better and deeper constructive engagement of 
the U.S with all countries in the region. Commentary on the Pacific Pivot can be seen in press 
conferences of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Defense (MND), or 
in the remarks of some senior MFA officials. Obviously, Chinese diplomatic responses to the 
Pacific Pivot seem to stress “strategic dimensions of the policy and its implications for the U.S-
China relationship in particular, or specific military issues, including U.S. military strategy; U.S. 
basing, deployments, or training; or U.S. actions towards territorial disputes, especially regarding 
the South China Sea”.71 The MFA and MND spokespersons oftern mention Beijing’s support for 
“the constructive role played by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific.72 This can be considered as China’s 
conditional acceptance of the presence of the U.S in the region. In other words, China only 
considers U.S. regional behaviors constructive when they have no adverse effects on Chinese 
and other regional countries’ interests and concerns. Furthermore, these behaviors must help to 
strengthen bilateral and regional cooperation to a certain extent. Since both the U.S and China 
have many interests in this region, in the Chinese view, it is necessary for the United States to 
respect the “interests and concerns of other parties in the Asia-Pacific, including China” and to 
“develop a relationship featuring mutual benefit, win-win and sound interaction between 
emerging and established power.”73 Official commentaries on this strategy also express a mild 
criticism of efforts to expand U.S. military deployments in the region. They claim that this 
attempt may increase regional tensions as well as undermine U.S. economic and trade relations 
with countries in the region.  
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In practice, the PRC sees the rise of U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region as “a threat to its 
position as a regional great power and a future global superpower.”74 In regards to South China 
Sea disputes, the Chinese Foreign Mnister in response to Clinton’s speech in 2010 said that “it 
was an attack on China designed to give the international community a wrong impression that 
the situation in the South China Sea is a cause for grave concern”.75 In other words, it was 
suggested that this is a threat to the security of China and an effort to intimidate and contain 
China. Thus, China’s response towards this policy is a “two-track diplomacy”.76 Meanwhile, 
China is using both hard and soft tools on both regional and bilateral levels. China tried to 
demonstrate its military strength, for example by testing a stealth fighter jet during the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense’s visit to China. In regards to soft tools, through such regional mechanism 
as ASEAN, China calls for other countries’ support as well as deterring them from deeper 
cooperation with the U.S by proposing closer cooperation with ASEAN countries through 
improving CAFTA, deepening financial collaboration, offering attractive deals and investments, 
and upgrading bilateral relationships to strategic partnerships. At the same time, towards the 
South China Sea dispute, China finds ways to prevent ASEAN countries from coming to a 
common approach to this matter, then impedes the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s efforts to bring 
this issue to the ASEAN and EAS summits.77    
To sum up, by looking at the U.S. rebalancing strategy to Asia-Pacific region and China’s 
responses to this in the view of political researchers, leaders and in practice, it is obvious that the 
two powers share the same purposes. On one hand, the U.S, by this strategy, hopes to protect its 
superpower status. On the other hand, China pursues the ambition to regain it. Thus, it can be 
said that the Sino-American relationship is undergoing a period when they are “neither friends 
nor enemies”.78 Consequently, it may not be long before we see an escalation of disputes in the 
region. Since China is an authoritarian state with a potential source of conflicts in itself and the 
U.S. rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region will not stop, the U.S and China must 
cooperate with each other if neither of these two countries wants to destabilise the region. In that 
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context, the principle of “peaceful competition” and “preventive cooperation” or a new type of 
great powers relationship appears to be helpful to both China and the U.S, and even to all 
regional countries as well as to international stability. This is based on conflicting and shared 
interests at the same time, not only on the military side but also in nontraditional areas such as 
energy, finance and climate change.79 
II. U.S. ASIAN ALLIES: JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA 
The U.S has had long-standing bilateral alliances with five countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. An important 
part of the U.S. rebalancing strategy towards this region includes strengthening these bilateral 
relations by reinforcing the network of U.S. regional alliances. By examining the responses of  
U.S. regional allies to the rebalancing strategy, it is possible to illustrate how and what the U.S 
could do to ensure the success of this policy in the region. Only the perspectives of Japan, South 
Korea and the Philippines towards this strategy can be analysed in this study because of limited 
time and length.  
1. Japan 
Generally speaking, Japan has welcomed the U.S. rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific 
region. Japanese specialists share a view that Japan and the United States should coordinate, 
especially in security strategies. In response to this U.S. stratey, two issues arise for the Japanese: 
(1) how to address the dramatically fast rise of China and (2) how Japan and the United States 
should work together to create better U.S. forward deployment in the region.  
The rise of China brings more complicated problems and a set of unprecedented unknowns to the 
international situation since it creates both tremendous opportunitites and serious challenges at 
the same time. To deal with this problem, the U.S. needs strategic cooperation with its allies in 
the region, especially Japan, in solving future security challenges. In military operation, the two 
countries have much room for cooperation. The two countries emphasize the concept of 
“dynamic defense force”, which means flexible employment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces 
(JSDF), focusing on the southwestern part of Japanese territory. This promises to help reinforce 
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U.S. capabilities to deal with challenges in the western Pacific. Japan as the key U.S. ally in the 
region should not look at this rebalancing strategy as an anti-China strategy. In fact, Japan should 
assume that the U.S would try to cooperate with China since these two countries share many 
interests in different fields in this strategic region. It is also necessary to take into serious 
consideration the rise of China’s military strength. The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS) in London estimated that China’s military spending in 2010 was $76.3 billion, 
second only to the United States ($693.6 billion). This budget even exceeded the military 
spending of Japan, which is only $54.4 billion.80 The purpose of this consideration is to prepare 
well and properly for any Chinese military action which might endanger the regional security.  
Regarding the forward deployment for the U.S. rebalancing, this requires closer alliances 
between the United States and Asia-Pacific countries. Otherwise, serious problems may develop. 
It is necessary for the United States and Japan to continue reinforcing the bilateral alliance 
relations, especially on alliance management issues including base realignment and the 
relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. “Geographically 
distributed, operationally resilient, politically sustainable” are key phrases to describe U.S. 
forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific.81 These phrases represent the principle under which all 
U.S movement would be conducted.  
Within the framework of the U.S. rebalancing strategy to Asia-Pacific, Japan as a key U.S. 
regional ally sees an urgent need to adopt new security strategies. From the Japanese perspective, 
the central factor which affects the success of this policy as well as the security landscape of the 
region is China’s rapid rise, including its military strength. Japanese political researchers think 
that it is necessary for Japan to build and maintain good and constructive relations with China 
with the hope that this kind of relationship may help to create a security environment in which 
China tends to be cooperative rather than confrontational.  
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2.  South Korea 
To Koreans in general, U.S. policy towards Asia has been rather ambiguous. With specific 
concern to its rebalancing strategy, Koreans think that it has three components, which include the 
policy approach to China as well as economic and security policies. First, regarding the policy 
approach to a rising China, the Obama Administration has the tendency to build stronger 
relations with China. According to Chaesung Chun, in the light of power transition theory, it is 
clearer that the power gap between China and the U.S is becoming more and more narrow. That 
is why the U.S cannot wait until China reaches power parity.82 As former Secretary of States, 
Hilary Clinton  stated in her remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace in March 2012, the U.S woud 
like to coexist with rising powers. Thus, there is an emerging slogan of “New forms of relations 
among great powers”. In this kind of new relationship, it is necessary for China, as the rising 
power to respect the rules established in the region. If the power trasition in the Asia-Pacific 
region is seen as a game and the U.S and China are two players in that game, it is compulsory for 
them to follow its already-established rules. By doing so, they may be able to express themselves 
not only as military powers but also as leaders in human rights, free trade and democracy. This 
helps to build their soft power. From this viewpoint, the policy of the U.S to return to Asia shows 
its intention of becoming “the leader of the game, the rule maker and the provider of collective 
goods”.83 
The next component of the U.S. strategy in the view of Korea is economic. As previously 
mentioned, the Asia-Pacific region is the center for U.S. economic interests and it is expected 
that the role of this area towards the U.S. economy will become more and more important in 
future.84 This explains why the Obama Administration is pursuing the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) aimed at “making Asian countries central to the National Export Initiative”.85 With the 
TPP, it is nearly certain that the U.S will take on more roles in this region in the future.  
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The last component is security. From the Koreans’ viewpoint, the U.S. rebalancing strategy aims 
at countering Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial strategy. In fact, Koreans think that the real 
purpose of this strategy is to reinforce a “more effective security architecture so that Washington 
can better manage a peaceful power shift in the Asia-Pacific”.86 The recent security architecture 
of the U.S, know as “hub-and-spoke”, no longer appears effective in the new environment. 
Rather, more cooperation among U.S. regional allies is needed. Such matters as sovereignty, 
nonintervention in domestic affairs and territorial integrity are likely to give rise to conflicts in 
the region. Sino-American relations will have certain effects on South Korea and Chun has 
argued that “South Korea will suffer not only from an all-out confrontation but also from small, 
procedural disagreements based in strategic mistrust”.87 A serious challenge for Sino-American 
strategic cooperation is that, on the one hand, it seems Chinese strategies are based on the 
combination of nationalism and conservatism. On the other hand, nearlly all kinds of partnership 
now are based on internationalism and liberalism. Therefore, it is difficult for China and the U.S 
to find opportunities for strategic cooperation. 
The alliance which has existed for almost six decades has successfully preserved the stability of 
the Korean Peninsula and managed regional security. In the context of a combination of related 
regional issues, the U.S is trying harder to promote its roles in the region while still wanting to 
maintain strong economic interdependence with China, which also has good economic relations 
with other Asian countries including South Korea. In the case of South Korea, the U.S has been 
its most important security partner but China has always been its biggest trading partner. Given 
that complicated context, the future of the U.S-ROK relationship will play a very crucial role in 
managing “the evolution of the regional balance of power, establish a cooperative mechanism for 
working with China, and address regional security issues”.88  
Apart from that, South Korea shows its most concern about how U.S. policy makers understand 
the fundamentals of East Asian international relations. Chun noted that regional populations are 
very complicated, made up of traditional, modern transitional, modern and postmodern 
transitional societies and most regional conflicts result from “the traditional strategic culture, the 
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legacy of imperialism and the persistent logic of balance of power”. Therefore, it is necessary for 
the U.S and South Korea to reinforce alliance relations and approach regional issues from more 
diverse and complex perspectives, taking the modern logic of power balances and sovereignty 
into consideration. 
 
III. VIETNAM 
1. A review of Vietnam-U.S relations 
Vietnam-US relations have a very long history involving many ups and downs. It can be said that 
the Vietnam War was the longest and the most bitter war in American history. On September 2, 
1945 when President Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam from French rule, 
General Vo Nguyen Giap mentioned that the relations between Vietnam and the United States of 
America were “particularly intimate relations…which it is a pleasant duty to dwell upon”.89 
Since the birth of modern Vietnam, America started playing a certain role in this country. The 
bilateral relationship between Vietnam and the United States can be divided into three phases 
including the Vietnam War, the normalization process and post-normalization development.  
In late 1940s when the French attempted to maintain control over the country, American 
engagement was limited to their support for the return of French troops to Vietnam with the hope 
that it could control the destiny of Vietnam. Later on, after the fall of China, American 
goevernment started showing a greater concern about South East Asia which was considered 
vital to the security and development as well as the strategic position of the U.S in the Asia-
Pacific. Due to Vietnam’s unique geopolitical position in the region, the U.S intended to prevent 
the fall to communism of an important strategic area in South East Asia. This led to the U.S. 
decision to intervene in the Vietnam War, which was a painful and bitter phase of history for 
both countries.Apart from the tremendous loss of lives, Vietnam and America also seriously 
suffered economic and political costs.   
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It took the two countries nearly 20 years to move to the normalization of formal bilateral 
diplomatic relations. After communist North Vietnam’s victory over the U.S in 1975, leaders in 
Hanoi started to express their hope of pursuing normalization. Vietnam’s government wanted to 
send a message of the desire to have good relations with the US on the basis of mutual respect, 
expressed through the fact that Vietnam created the opportunity for American troops to 
withdraw. Moreover,Vietnam had tried not to worsen the bilateral relationship. It was said that 
there was no hostile attitudes twards America and in turn, Vietnam did not want to see that from 
the American side. From the American side, as mentioned in the Article 21 of the Paris 
Agreement, the U.S stated that they would “contribute to healing the wounds of war and to 
postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam”.90 However, the U.S. 
government at that time did not mean this was their contribution to the war damages. From the 
Vietnamese side, in 1975, Premier Pham Van Dong when speaking to the National 
Assemblywanted the US to normalize relations with Vietnam and to respect commitments to 
provide reconstruction funds. 
In May 1976, President Gerald R.Ford made a request to the US Senate to temporarily stop the 
embargo on Vietnam in six months to create favourable conditions for bilateral dialogues. Only 
one day after this request, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sent an official diplomatic note to 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam Nguyen Co Thach requiring more discussions on the 
normalization of the bilateral relations. There were certainly conditions of normalization from 
both sides related to solving the legacy of the war. In 1977, the Carter Adminstration made great 
efforts towards normalization. The first negotiation meeting was held in Paris in May 1977 but 
reached no result. It was only when there was a risk of a border war with China that Vietnam 
really saw the necessity for normalization of relations with the US, a superpower in the world. 
However, the process of normalization met other difficulties. In response to the efforts of the 
Vietnamese side, the US said the normalizaion process needed to be slower. Another signal that 
showed the U.S. desire to improve relations with Vietnam was that the U.S. government no 
longer vetoed Vietnam’s desire to become a member of the United Nations.91 The Vietnamese 
and U.S. governments continued the negotiation process with a view to meet all bilateral 
preconditions but the viewpoints of the two sides did not meet. The two countries at that time 
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tried to make adjustments with a view to normalization. However, due to the bitter feelings as a 
result of the failure in the war in the U.S and the influence of Congress, Vietnam failed to have 
the opportunity at that time to normalize its relations with the U.S.  
But then a new context of international and regional politics positively influenced the 
normalization process between Vietnam and US. After Vietnam implemented its ‘Doi Moi” 
policy, the U.S recognized certain advantages in normalizing relations with Vietnam especially 
with respect to economic interests, finding the Missing in Action (POW/MIA) as well as its 
balanced strategy in the East Asia-Pacific. In 1991, the U.S issued the 4-step agenda of the Bush 
Administration towards normalization. The normalization policy with Vietnam was initially 
shaped by the Bush Administration and pushed forward in the Clinton Administration. Thanks to 
the great efforts of the two sides, the U.S. embargo on Vietnam was eventually lifted in February 
1994. Only about one year later, on July 11 1995, President Clinton announced official normal 
diplomatic relation with Vietnam followed by booming trade volumes in the subsequent years.92  
After normalization, bilateral relations between the two countries continued to develop in a 
positive way. Within 20 years of normalization, the bilateral turnover of trade reached nearly 
US$30 billion, which was more than 130 times as much as that of 1994. Vietnam is now the 29th 
biggest trade partner of the United States. The trade growth of the two countries has been as high 
as 20% each year. The total direct investment budget of the U.S to Vietnam is US$11 billion, 
ranking 7th in the list of countries and territories having direct investment in Vietnam.  During 
the visit of the Vietnamese State President Truong Tan Sang to the U.S in July 2013, the two 
countries reached a framework for advancing the bilateral relationship through “the Vietnam-US 
Comprehensive Partnership”. This is the key to bolstering bilateral relations as well as to 
underscore the enduring U.S commitment to the Asia-Pacific rebalance. Within this framework, 
Vietnam and the United Stated will cooperate in maritime capacity building, economic 
engagement, climate change and environmental issues, education and promoting respect for 
human rights.93  
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In conclusion, when looking at the history of Vietnam-US relations, it is clear that during the 
time of Vietnam War, the US focused mostly on military invlovement, or hard power in 
Vietnam. That was the reason why they achieved nothing except a bitter failure with huge war 
costs and loss of lives. Only when there was a mixture of both hard power and soft power at 
play, through open diplomatic dialogues during the normalization process could America achieve 
certain benefits. And now, as relations are moving to a new level, the signals of more soft power 
can be seen in U.S. policies in diplomacy, education, economic, scientific and technology 
cooperations as well as cultural exchanges. It can be said that the example of Vietnam is a lesson 
to the U.S when considering whether to use soft or hard power to protect or regain its 
superpower status in the world. 
2. Effects of the rebalancing policy on Vietnam, Vietnam-U.S relations and Vietnam’s 
reactions towards the rebalance 
In order to assess Vietnamese reactions to the American rebbalancing strategy and its impact on 
bilateral relations, about 20 interviews of interested parties were carried out with the purpose of 
sampling the views of people from different levels, social statuses, ages, occupations and 
political beliefs toward this strategy. The majority of the interviewees said that the U.S 
government lacked a strategic view on the role of Vietnam in its foreign policies in general and 
in the “pivot” in particular. Yet, Vietnam may become an important partner in the Southeast Asia 
region which can effectively support the U.S in its rebalancing strategy. A  Pew Reaserch survey 
in 2002 showed that 71% of Vietnamese are in favor of the United States and 76% are interested 
in American people. This can be seen through the growing number of exchange activities 
between the people of the two countries.  
According to the Vietnamese interviewees, the strategy has had a number of influences on U.S. 
policies towards Vietnam. The obvious effect of the rebalance on Vietnam can be seen through 
the decision of the U.S. government to upgrade the bilateral relationship with Vietnam to a 
“comprehensive partnership”. This brings both adavantages and disadvantages to Vietnam. This 
upgrade shows that the U.S. attaches importance to the bilateral relationship, the role of Vietnam 
in the region and to Vietnam as a channel for the U.S to have more engagement in regional and 
sub-regional cooperation mechanisms, especially ASEAN. This “comprehensive partnership” 
creates a new framework for cooperation in the fields of politics, diplomacy, economics, trade, 
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science, technology, education and training, environment, health care, humanitarian cooperation, 
war aftermath issues, defense and security, human rights protection and promotion, culture, 
sports and tourism. As a result, cooperation between Vietnam and the U.S in every field will 
become more pratical and productive in coming times. A regular dialogue mechanism between 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam and the U.S. Department of State has also been 
established, opening an official channel for the two countries to discuss issues of mutual concern, 
especially sensitive ones that are still barriers to positive bilateral relations. Moreover, according 
to most interviewees, this partnership will also bring to Vietnam many chances of economic 
cooperations with other countries beside the U.S with the support of the Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA) as well as the US-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement 
(E3) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum. This also helps Vietnam to 
gain more international recognition of its open policies and the market economy.  
Thanks to all those advantages of development and dialogues, Vietnam State President Truong 
Tan Sang affirmed that Vietnam welcomes the US strengthening cooperation with the Asia-
Pacific for the peace, stability and prosperity of the region. Those who were interviewed also 
shared the attitude of the government in welcoming the strategy, especially if this strategy could 
help to better bilateral relations, develop Vietnam’s economic development and support regional 
development and security. The interviewees also mentioned existing barriers in the bilateral 
relationship between Vietnam and US such as human rights, religious freedom, victims of Agent 
Orange and dealing with the war’s legacy. They expressed hope that the “pivot” could bring 
certain positive changes and progress on in these issues which might help to ease tension in the 
bilateral relationship.  
In the context of increasing regional tension because Vietnam occupies a special strategic 
location in the South East Asian, Vietnam is getting unavoidablly drawn into those conflicts. 
Vietnam also has to face the strategic challenge posed by China, a big neighbouring country. 
China’s most advanced aircraft and conventional missiles can reach Vietnam at any time. The 
geopolitical position of Vietnam in the South China Sea does not allow Vietnam to distance itself 
from the regional territorial conflicts because of its national security. However, those who were 
interviewed share the same viewpoint that since the United States has avoided explicit discussion 
about South China Sea disputes, Vietnam should not look forward to any kind of support from 
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the U.S regarding this problem. Vietnamese may welcome and encourage US reconsideration of 
the “pivot” and its effort to restore regional stability, but at the same time should find their own 
way to balance the relationship with China and protect themselves from any conflicts that might 
arise from the territorial disputes. Therefore, rather than becoming entangled in regional 
disputes, Vietnam can contribute to the restoration of regional stability and development.  
The complicated relationship between Vietnam and China and the United States raises the 
question of whether there should be a so-called “triangular relationship” between the three 
nations. The majority of the interviewees answered “NO” for the reason that Vietnam could not 
risk such a time-consuming and money-consuming game with unexpected outcomes. Rather, 
Vietnam will take careful steps in any further cooperation with both China and the U.S, taking 
into consideration all the advantages and disadvantages Vietnam might face. Those decisions 
will certainly be based on the interests of the people, the interests of the country and the 
development, security and stability of the region and the world. All in all, the consensus view 
was that Vietnam should try to maintain a soft balance with both China and the United States 
without showing special favor to either of them. In stead of focusing too much on bilateral 
policies, paying more attention to promote Vietnam’s involvement and engagement in 
multilateral security and economic mechanisms in the region will be a wiser choice for Vietnam 
in such a complicated circumstance.   
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CHAPTER IV: POSSIBLE FUTURE OF THE REBALANCE 
I. POSITIVE OPPORTUNITIES AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS 
At present, although the Republican and Democratic Parties in the U.S do not agree with each 
other on many issues they seem to have a consensus on the rebalancing strategy towards the 
Asia-Pacific, which not only strengthens Obama’s determination to implement this strategy but 
also creates an important political foundation for specific policies. However, according to the -
“China-US Focus”-, the future of the strategy depends on the four following factors. 94 
First, there is the not-yet-optimistic financial situation of the U.S, exemplified through the fact 
that many U.S. government’s agencies recently had to close temporarily. In order to deal with its 
financial challenges, the Obama Administration has had to reduce military expenses. Although 
this might help to prevent high budget deficits for the U.S. government, it has negative effects on 
the U.S. ability to take action in the world, especially in dealing with international crises. 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced that more than US$1,000 billion would be cut from 
its military budget within the next decade. According to some, these cuts are “too much, too 
abrupt, and too irresponsible” with serious consequences for American military activities.95 
Furthermore, due to the difficult economic situation, popular support for American foreign 
policy has also gone down. This also creates an obstacle for President Obama in affirming his 
purpose to continue implementing the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. According to a recent 
survey, 56% of interviewees were disappointed by the foreign policy of the Obama 
Administration, with 52% stating that U.S should prioritize domestic affairs rather than paying 
too much attention and money to international affairs. Americans think that only by restoring 
prosperity can the U.S regain its position in the world arena. There is no need for the government 
to do anything in regards to international affairs, especially in the context that they have not yet 
been able to deal with their own problems. It is the first time for nearly 40 years that U.S. 
international influence declined according to 53% of interviewees. 
Secondly, the future of the rebalancing strategy depends a lot on the security situation of other 
areas in the world. Basically, the U.S has to re-construct their forces. In case the security 
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situation worsens in other areas of the world, the U.S will have no other choices except cutting 
down on their force, which initially used to reinforce their power in Asia, meaning that this 
strategy is not only independent of domestic considerations but also greatly depends on outside 
factors. 
Thirdly, the attitudes of Asian countries limit the policies of the Obama Administration. Since 
being officially announced, the “pivot” has been receiving contradictory responses from Asian 
countries, both welcoming and not welcoming this policy for several reasons. Those who 
welcome American engagement in Asian issues hope that the U.S might be a power to balance 
an emerging China and might support them in dealing with their conflicts with China. Some 
Asian countries cannot express their total support for the “pivot”. They cannot put their national 
security and geostrategic policies in danger merely because of economic benefits. Thus, they still 
need to maintain their good relationship with China. Since China itself is an Asian country, a 
majority of Asian countries find it very difficult having to choose who to stand with, China or the 
U.S. A soft balanced diplomacy becomes the favored and most suitable option for them in that 
context.  
Another crucial element is the rapid rise of China, which poses a major threat to the success of 
the rebalance. No matter whether or not the U.S. government admits that the strategy is aimed at 
confronting China, anyone can obviously realize what this as a significant motivation for this 
policy. As a result, the growth of China has now become the most important factor affecting the 
future of the rebalancing strategy. The overall objective of this strategy is to achieve greater 
benefits in Asia, which requires the U.S. government to find a suitable way to deal with the Sino-
American relationship when carrying out this strategy. It means that the two powers need to lay 
out certain principles to guide their “peaceful” coexistence since this relationship not only affects 
the people of the two countries, but also has certain influences on other regional ones. With these 
“special responsibilities” in mind, the two powers should spend more time on bilateral dialogues 
to reach agreement on the roadmap of cooperation in the years to come so as to be able to 
“minimize the possibility of conflict or confrontation”.96 
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Ultimately, the question remains whether or not the U.S will continue this “pivot”. Most of the 
American interviewees who work in the legislative branch of the U.S. government answered 
“YES” since this strategy originated not only out of American interests but is also inspired by 
Southeast Asian countries themselves. This region, to a certain extent, relies on the economic 
and military power of the U.S to balance power. They need the U.S to contribute to regional 
development and security. 
Other factors affecting the implementation of the rebalancing strategy include domestic 
constraints and continued engagement in the Middle East. On the one hand, U.S. policy-makers 
totally understand the necessity and importance of their President’s visits to Asian countries 
because these visits may lay the foundations for cooperation and engagement of the U.S in every 
field with the destination countries. On the other hand, the U.S government had no choices about 
cancelling those visits due to domestic political pressures, such as those relating to the close of 
part of the federal government. Let us consider some examples. In March 2010, President Obama 
cancelled his visit to Indonesia and Australia in order to focus on advocating for the law on 
medical care. In June 2010, he cancelled his visit to these countries again due to the oil spill in 
Mexico Gulf. The Presidents’ visits play an especially important role in achieving general 
strategic objectives, in contrast to the technical agreements achieved through lower-level 
negotiations. President Obama’s visits aim at confirming the important role of the Asia-Pacific 
region for U.S. security and prosperity. However, these two issues have been sidelined from the 
“agenda” of the leader of the U.S. In the Philippines, Obama wished to come to an agreement 
allowing greater flexibility for the U.S. military by using the military bases in the Philippines for 
troop rotation. The U.S lost its permanent bases in the Philippines in 1992 and since 1999, they 
have relied on an agreement which allows promoting the rotation of visiting forces. In the 
context of the quickly changing security environment in the region and more tensions in the 
South China Sea, the U.S and the Philippines have tried to revive their military alliance. A visit 
by Obama would bolster U.S. efforts in diplomatically advocating for this purpose. In Malaysia, 
Obama intended to have a discussion with Prime Minister Najib Razak about the negotiations for 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP). Opposition towards the TPP has grown recently because of 
such issues as intellectual property, state enterprises’ reform, labor criteria and environmental 
issues.  
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In contrast to Obama’s cancellation of visits, Chinese President Xi Jinping moved forward his 
visit to Asian countries, particularly Malaysia in October 2013. Since 2009, China has found 
ways to reconnect with Malaysia, both due to their economic interests and the T-junction 
strategic position of this country in the Southeast Asia. China has not joined the TPP negotiations 
but they still can offer huge investment opportunities to Malaysia without any conditions. With 
the hope of promoting its position in the region and continuing to split ASEAN in the South 
China Sea disputes, China has tried to encourage Malaysia to share their viewpoints in 
negotiations with the rest of ASEAN countries regarding COC. In the context that both China 
and the U.S are trying to “woo” Malaysia, the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping stood in 
contradiction to the absence of Obama.  
The cancellations of the U.S. President’s visits before 2014 illustrated the difficulties 
Washington has had so far in this rebalance. It also remains the case that U.S foreign policies 
still have a considerable focus on the Middle East and adjacent regions since they have 
withdrawn their military troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, made efforts in negotiating the 
normalization of relations with Iran, controlled relations with its Israeli allies and tried to 
eliminate chemical weapons in Syria together with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Although the 
cancellations caused no changes in the long-term policies of the U.S towards this mainly Islamic 
country, the absence of Obama obviously sent negative signals to Malaysia in TPP negotiations. 
Malaysia itself has now completely integrated to the region and the world, has achieved a 
relatively high competitive rank and has trade agreements with most TPP members. Malaysia 
would like more access to American markets with the purpose of becoming a developed 
economy.  
However, five years after the declaration of American foreign policy focusing on Asia (in the 
context of Washington sinking deeper and deeper into the Ukraine crisis, the Syrian issue and 
Iran's nuclear threat), President Obama decided to make a weeklong visit to four Asian countries 
including Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines in April 2014 with an aim to 
consolidate the U.S. allies’ faith in its rebalancing strategy and demonstrate his commitments to 
the region, which had been more or less “shaken” due to his previous cancellations. This is the 
fifth trip to Asia of Obama as the U.S. President and Japan was his first stop. It is said that this 
trip was to make up for his not attending APEC last October. Trade and security were the top 
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issues on Obama’s agenda with a hope to rebalance the American military presence as well as 
diplomatic and economic resources.  
All of the four countries included in President Obama’s visit are in dispute with China in the 
South China Sea. According to the observers, this visit is a chance for leaders of these countries 
to measure the readiness to help of the United States in case of conflicts. 
In the context that the U.S. regional allies feel suspicious of the commitment of the U.S to the 
region, this visit was essential in consolidating the beliefs amongst allies that the U.S will 
continue implementing in this policy. The most obvious result of this Asia trip by the head of the 
White House was the bilateral security and cooperation agreements. 
Given that the U.S rebalancing strategy still has to overcome so many obstacles, it is important 
that its allies in the region like Japan and Australia support the regional strategy and continue 
their own engagement with ASEAN. Japan has opened up their policy by getting involved in 
such international trade agreements as TPP and proposing security, economic and diplomacy 
policies directly towards Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has a diplomatic agenda 
with each ASEAN country. Their purpose is to promote national prestige by revitalizing existing 
relations (mostly based on aid and investment), while also facing the emerging concerns of 
China. This requires Japan to find regional support in the normalization of the military role of 
Japan for the peace and stability of the region and the world.  
In summary, although the cancellation of Obama’s visits before 2014 showed that the U.S still 
lacks the necessary ability to realize the rebalancing strategy in the region, his recent visit to Asia 
reaffirmed the U.S. rebalancing strategy to the region. It means that this strategy will continue to 
be implemented because it originates not only from American interests but from the interests of 
the Southeast Asian countries as well. With its own power, Japan itself together with other U.S. 
allies in the region can help to play a certain role in strengthening U.S. engagement in ASEAN. 
The support from Japan is not only because of American interests, but again is due to the demand 
for development and security towards sustainable relations in the region.97 
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II. SUSTAINABLE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT FOR THE US IN ASIA ON THE BASIS 
OF SOFT POWER 
According to some senior advisors to the U.S. Senate and the House of Representative who were 
interviewed about the possible future of the policy, such difficulties and obstacles that the U.S. 
government has met so far in implementing the rebalancing strategy result from mismanagement, 
miscommunication and misconduct in the early stage of rebalancing. The final goal of the 
strategy is to restore US power and its global leadership.98 It is obvious that the strategy became 
over-extended relative to demands for resource investment. In the complicated context of tight 
budget cuts, the worried attitudes of regional countries including U.S. allies about whether 
“Washington’s deeds match its words”,99 the question about the sustainability of the strategy still 
elicits no precise answers. The important thing that the U.S. government needs to take into 
serious consideration is how to balance their hard and soft power before carrying out specific 
policies toward the region. There are several things that the U.S needs to do in order to ensure 
the sustainability of this strategy.  
1. China-US relations 
While the U.S has to overcome a difficult period in history due to the consequences of the global 
financial crisis, China has been emerging with dramatic growth. At the same time, China’s 
diplomatic policies with other countries in the world, especially in the region, are also being 
adjusted along tougher lines. At the early stages of the strategy, U.S. engagement in the region 
was mostly in military terms, which has made several countries (especially China), become more 
aggressive. As previously stated, whether the U.S acknowledges it or not, the rebalance 
obviously targets China, however it does not mean that the U.S will contain or confront China. In 
order to restore its position in the region, the U.S needs to redraw a new image of the strategy 
without any activities targeting China. The U.S should play a certain role in helping to build and 
improve the political, economic and security order in the Asia-Pacific region while considering 
the strategic growth of China. The U.S should find a way to make China either integrate into the 
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new system or break through that.100 Stated in another way, it is not military engagement that can 
bring about anything meaningful to the U.S. It requires adjustment of policy in a way that 
includes political and economic engagement policies that might help bring China to “a new 
crossroads”.   
Since China is an emerging regional country that might have various influences on the U.S 
economy and security, it is always considered one of the countries providing significant 
challenges to the U.S. government in their policy-making. That is the reason why during 
Obama’s first term, U.S. policy towards China appeared quite negative. From a political 
perspective, China is viewed as “an uncertain power and a potential challenger to global 
leadership”. From the military side, it is seen as a “potential adversary and strategic competitor”. 
Economically speaking, China is said to be a “rule-breaking competitor”.101 During the second 
term of the Obama Administration, it would be better for the rebalancing strategy if the U.S 
government had a more positive view towards China and China-US relations, since this plays a 
very important part in the future deployment of the rebalance. Tom Donilon proposed the idea of 
building a constructive relationship with China and affirmed that this is one of the pillars of the 
strategy.102 From that viewpoint, it is necessary for the U.S to build a positive major-power 
partnership with China, which can be called a relationship between “an existing power and the 
emerging one’. The factor that lays the foundation for that relationship is mutual trust. Former 
Chinese President Hu Jintao mentioned this in his remarks to the May 2012 Strategic Economic 
Dialogue. He emphasized that “to build a new type of relations between China and the United 
States, we need to trust each other”.103 However, this is still a hard question to which both China 
and the US have not found out the answer. When the US blames China for its lack of real and 
believable cooperative attitudes, China accuses the U.S of undermining China’s core interests 
and major concerns including the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu). In any 
event, constructive cooperation and bilateral mutual trust are crucial to ensuring the future of the 
rebalancing strategy. 
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It is obvious that US-China relations are “multidimensional, comprehensive and complex” 
because they are the two largest economies, the two largest consumers of natural resources as 
well as the two largest emitters of CO2 emissions.104 They need each other to succeed in the 
world in every field. Since they share many mutual benefits, they should also share 
responsibilities in maintaining peace and stability in the region. In that context, it would be much 
better for China and the U.S as well as other regional countries if China and the U.S could work 
together in solving emerging problems rather than confronting each other. However, the problem 
is that, although being very tough issues related to national (particularly territorial) interests with 
the manner of a superpower, when being pressed to play or  act any role on the international 
stage, instead of shouldering their “responsibilities”, Beijing insists that China “is still a 
developing nation, preoccupied with internal issues”.105 It is also not too difficult to see that it is 
nearly impossible for the U.S to pull back from Asia to leave the floor for China to global and 
regional leadership. The U.S will certainly never leave the region and the U.S. government has 
never had an intention to “reduce its footprint” here.106 As Mohan Malik has noted, there are four 
questions that China and the U.S need to answer before deciding any policies related to the 
region.  
1. “What does the Asia-Pacific region want from China and the United States? 
2. What sort of regional order Asians want to live in the years and decades ahead? 
3. What is China’s vision of the regional order in the years and decades ahead? 
4. More importantly, are the US and Chinese visions in sync with regional aspirations? 
What are the similarities and differences in those visions?” 
The fact is that the Asia-Pacific region is too big for any country to dominate. Chinese President 
Xi affirmed that, “the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries of China 
and the United States”.107 If China and the U.S can build a constructive bilateral relationship 
based on common security and development based of each country’s core interests, they can both 
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become powerful and major powers in the region without having to face any military conflicts. 
Since “the emerging multi-polarity and multilateralism in Asia provide incentives for major 
powers to pursue a moderate, cooperative foreign policy that promotes stability and growth”, all 
regional countries should look forward to win-win games rather than zero-sum ones in this 
region. 
2. Toning down, managing tempo and making modest shifts 
In the early days of the strategy, international views towards this strategy were that it merely 
represented the increase of the U.S military presence in the region. However, as mentioned, this 
was due to mismanagement, miscommunication and misconduct. Moreover, it may be because 
the military engagement seemed to be too fast and even faster than economic or diplomatic 
engagement. Therefore, the U.S government needs to “calm down” and manage their relations in 
a more stable and balanced manner. This is an obvious opportunity for the U.S government to 
consider “soft power”. Instead of an overly aggressive military presence in the region, it would 
be better if the U.S government now could think of more engaged policies in economic, cultural, 
scientific and diplomatic cooperation with its partners in the region. Secretary of State John 
Kerry in his remarks on a 21st century Pacific Partnership with Japan said, “President Obama 
made a smart and a strategic commitment to rebalance our interests and investments in Asia”.108 
This means that the U.S. government will have to spend more time, energy, intellectual capital 
and resources to realize the rebalance with a view not to target an individual country or group of 
countries.  
There are certain signals indicating that President Obama intends to have a “purposeful focus on 
Asia” during his second term.109 This does not mean that the U.S needs to increase its military 
presence in the region. On the other hand, it is critical to show its involvement in dealing with 
economic, development and security issues in the region. In the meantime, the U.S should not 
withdraw all its forces in the Middle East. They should take a gradual approach in making any 
adjustments in their activities and approach, rather than “a simple and abrupt repositioning of 
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forces”.110 Making modest shifts here does not merely mean military shifts but also diplomatic, 
security and economic shifts. Let us consider the TPP negotiations. Although this agreement has 
not reached a conclusion, once it is signed, it will become the broadest trade agreement in the 
world. Thanks to the TPP, a number of billion dollars will be added to the U.S economy. At the 
same time, it will enhance the political, financial and military commitments of Washington 
towards the region of Asia-Pacific for decades ahead. In case the TPP talks do not reach a 
conclusion, it will represent a great failure for the Obama Administration. Moreover, it will also 
harm the objective of maintaining the permanent presence of the U.S in the region. As a result, 
the Obama Administration now has to find ways to meet the demands of TPP negotiations, 
address the requirements of the interested stakeholders and at the same time direct the TPP in 
ways that are favorable for the U.S.  
Stated in another way, it is now time for the U.S government to think about the investment of 
“soft power’ and “smart power” to bring regional countries together for economic, political, 
military, investment and trade development. On his visit to Asia, Secretary of State John Kerry 
reaffirmed the four principles of growth, which are “strong growth, fair growth, smart growth 
and just growth”. Based on such foundations, in 2012, the U.S showed greater engagement in 
regional mechanisms especially ASEAN. The United States and ASEAN announced the 
Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) initiative, a US-ASEAN bilateral Investment Treaty, a 
US-Asia-Pacific Comprehensive Partnership for Sustainable Energy Future, etc. This form of 
engagement is a more effective way for the U.S to deploy its rebalancing strategy. 
3. Being more cautious when getting involve in regional conflicts 
At the beginning of his first term, President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took a 
relatively tough approach to their diplomatic policies. For example, breaking the United States’ 
tradition of ‘taking no position” on the Sensaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, the United States at that 
time stated that the “Diaoyu islands were under the administrative authority of Japan”.111 
Regarding the South China Sea Disputes, the United States for the very first time blamed China 
for escalating tensions in the region. The fact that the U.S took a certain position in this dispute 
appeared to affect its relations with related parties. It suggested that from now on, it would be 
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better if Washington did not issue official opinions or responses to such issues. During his visit 
to Indonesia, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said that the United States does not 
“take sides when it comes to competing territorial and historical claims, but we do take the side 
of peaceful resolution of disputes in a manner consistent with international law”. It means that 
the United States has been trying to maintain their neutral status and exert pressures on the 
involved parties.  
It may be asked if any activities of the U.S. government really catch the eye of public. Thus, 
when the rebalance is interpreted as containing China and China is getting involved in many 
regional disputes including both territorial and historical ones, the United States should be 
cautious about how they react to these matters. Some regional countries, especially U.S. allies, 
will certainly find ways to get support from the U.S to challenge China in the disputes. Thus, the 
U.S. should be careful in sending any signals which might cause misunderstanding to related 
parties. The worst scenario if the U.S remains involved in such disputes is the risk of war, which 
no countries in the region expect at the moment. Moreover, nearly no countries in the region are 
interested in choosing either China or US. They understand the competition between these two 
powers in unavoidable but it would be better if that competition does not lead to conflicts and the 
two major powers know exactly how to harmonize and moderate their interests in accordance 
with the interests of other regional countries.  
On the other hand, a problem arises when the U.S takes cautious steps in such regional disputes. 
China takes that chance to increase suspicion about U.S. capability as well as to arouse the U.S. 
allies in the region. In that context, the U.S needs to reinforce its commitments with its regional 
allies but at the same time confirms with allies that they should not abuse these commitments to 
escalate tensions in the region. Secondly, the U.S should increase its discussion and interaction 
with its allies. Moreover, it is necessary to establish a marine security framework with the 
participation or strong commitment of China as well as other Asian countries in the South China 
Sea and the East China Sea, and at the same time improving marine abilities in ensuring the 
security of the energy transportation sea-lanes that China and many other countries depend on. 
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4. Focusing more on educational, cultural, scientific and technology exchanges with the 
region 
In order to regain the reputation, which constitutes the foundation for soft power, the U.S. 
government should pursue more policies focusing on developing and sponsoring educational, 
cultural, scientific and technological exchanges between the U.S and all countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. The purpose of this is to bring American values to the region as well as to 
reorienting regional people towards the purpose of the rebalancing strategy. Educational 
exchanges, including both formal and informal education should be recognized as a process 
critical for promoting sustainable deployment of the policy. Educational exchanges are 
indispensable to changing people's attitudes toward the strategy so that they have the capacity to 
assess and address the strategy in the way that the U.S want. It is especially critical if the 
Department of State could think of programs for young political leaders who will participate in 
decision-making and policy-making process in the future. To be effective, these exchanges 
should deal with the dynamics of education, culture, science and technology, should be attuned 
to the diversity of the region, and should employ formal and informal methods and effective 
means of communication. Recognizing that countries and regional organizations will develop 
their own priorities and schedules in accordance with their needs, policies and programs, such 
exchange programs should focus on objectives to broaden basic understanding or 
misunderstanding about the policy. Moreover, these exchanges may serve as a channel for the 
U.S. government to achieve awareness in all sectors of society on a regional scale as soon as 
possible. The U.S. government should not carry out these exchanges alone. This should be done 
in cooperation with all sectors of society, especially through American non-governmental 
organizations since they can make great contributions to facilitate these programs. Then, they 
should allocate some of the government’s budget to sponsor the programs as well. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
International politics usually lead to the story of power. In other words, power is the key 
concept and “one of the most troublesome fields of international relations”.112 Ever since 
Joseph Nye initiated the concept of “soft power”, much research has been undertaken to look 
into what exactly soft power is in international relations and how to have and invest soft 
power in policy-making progress. Looking at the world today where there is globalization 
and the extraordinary advances in technology that we call the information revolution, there 
are many international problems that need the involvement of many countries to deal with, 
like terrorism. Such problems are not new but they become more and more complicated. This 
is not a time for policy-makers to adopt a “one-dimensional view” in a three-dimensional 
world. All powerful countries in the world should think of how they can do what they wish 
but still give others choices to follow through the use of “carrots and sticks”.  
The use of soft power in politics therefore becomes more popular. It is more and more 
obvious that “carrots” are becoming more effective than “sticks”. The fact is that the soft 
power of a country can derive from many sources including culture, political values and 
foreign policies. Many countries in the world today have started thinking about how to make 
use of these resources to make up their soft power. Certainly, the United States of America is 
not an exception. In fact, American leaders thought of this quite a long time ago and they did 
certain things, had specific policies to spread American culture and political values to the 
world. This partly helped the U.S to achieve superpower status. As time went by, the lesson 
the U.S gained from both victories and failures in the past is that the overexploitation of any 
kinds of power leads to failures. The Vietnam War was an example when the U.S failed due 
to their over-reliance on military power. The best result may come only when there is a 
balanced interplay of “carrots” and “sticks”, which equals to “soft” and “hard” power. 
“Smart power”, which is the combination of soft and hard power, has become the kind of 
power that every major power in the world pursues. When countries’ policies are formulated 
in the way that involves the views and interests of others, those countries will become more 
attractive than others and will be seen as legitimate. 
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When considering American soft power or smart power in the present time, in particular in 
its rebalancing strategy towards Asia-Pacific region, it seems that the U.S rebalance has been 
too dominated by its military dimension and has somewhat overlooked the other dimensions 
of power. With the four components of the policy including economic interests, cultural 
impacts, foreign policies and security engagement, three quarters of which are related to 
building soft power, the U.S government has made mistakes when starting the strategy with 
mainly military engagement. It is nearly impossible for the U.S to advance any economic 
interests or cultural impacts with hard power. If so, those impacts would not be sustainable. 
Therefore, this strategy could only be balanced and sustainable if the soft power dimension is 
leveraged more actively and effectively. It is certain that different Asian countries will have 
different responses to the American rebalancing strategy, which is not surprising. This is 
partly because each Asian country has its own national, regional and international interests. 
The ways they respond reflect those interests. However, the fundamental interest of all 
countries in the region is that they want to have good relations and cooperation with both the 
United States and China in economic development and regional tension reduction. 
Nowadays, the United States is still the top country in the region for their soft power. 44% of 
the Chinese people, 47% of the Japanese, 42% of Korean and 58% of Indonesians accepted 
that the American influence in Asia has increased in a couple of decades. It means that the 
U.S still has more power than China, both hard and soft. However, the problem is that the 
United States has not found the appropriate way to make use of and promote this power, 
together with their military and economic power to achieve the goals they want. Many people 
believe that the soft power of a powerful country depends on the level of international 
cooperation that they can bring to deal with difficult international issues. The United States 
have many advantages in protecting its sole superpower status in the region and in the world 
as well. 
Before launching any specific policies to further implement the rebalance, the U.S should 
pay more attention to the country’s economic challenges. At the same time, they need to 
reconstruct their forces in other areas of the world and further strengthen alliance relations 
with Japan and South Korea. Another important thing is to keep a close eye on the rapid rise 
of China to take certain actions when necessary to pre-empt developments which might cause 
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problems for the U.S. Therefore, the urgent thing U.S policy-makers have to do is to think of 
how to build reasonable relations with China. Managing any policies towards the region in a 
calm way, especially toward sensitive regional conflicts, is also critical for American policy-
makers to bear in mind. 
Public diplomacy, which is now considered one of the best ways to promote the soft power 
of a country, could be something that the U.S. government should spend time and money 
working on. It is also an important “weapon” to implement smart power. Public diplomacy 
cannot only bring about influence. It also brings about positive changes to attitudes toward 
U.S. foreign policies, the American people, American society and values. The ability to form 
the policies that not only meet the interests of related parties but also address culture, values, 
political system, and ethics will bring about “smart’ power. International politics now involve 
a battle of gaining trust. The more international trust a country gains, the more power they 
have. The rebalancing strategy to Asia-Pacific will not be successful only with the region's 
political leaders. The policy needs the public of the regional countries to trust the United 
States will bring development, peace and prosperity to the region. Achieving that will require 
robust public diplomacy at the center of U.S. policy initiatives. 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES’ PLACES OF WORK 
 
1. The Americas Department- The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations 
2. The Asia-Africa Department- The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations 
3. Committee for Foreign Non-Governmental Organization Affairs (COMINGO) 
4. Institute for Chinese Studies- Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) 
5. Institute for Americas Studies- Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) 
6. Vietnam Economic Institute- Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) 
7. Department of International Organizations- Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
8. Americas Department - Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
9. Institute for Religious Studies- Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) 
10. Vietnam News Agency 
11. Department of Policy Planning- Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) 
12. Institute for Policies and Strategic Studies- Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
13. Institute for Human Rights Studies 
14. Central Committee for External Relations 
15. Office of the State President 
16. Committee for International Affairs of the National Assembly of Vietnam 
17. The Vietnam-USA Society 
18. The U.S House Committee on International Relations 
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19. The U.S Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs 
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